Showing posts with label lack-of-standing. Show all posts
Showing posts with label lack-of-standing. Show all posts

Friday, May 18, 2012

[No] Legal standing to complain: Texas Supreme Court nixes citizen's suit to challenge balloting process that favors political parties as unconstitutional

 
SUPREMES SAY WOULD-BE ELECTION-SYSTEM REFORMER WHO TOOK A STAND AGAINST PARTISAN BALLOTING DID NOT HAVE STANDING
    
Honorable Hope Andrade v. [Average Joe tax-paying Citizen] Don Veneable (Tex. May 18, 2012)
  
In an anonymous per curiam opinion, the Texas Supreme Court this morning disposed of a Dallas resident's constitutional challenge to partisan identification of candidates and straight-ticket voting option on the general election ballot on standing grounds. The challenged feature of the general election ballot process allows voters to vote for all candidates of the same political party simultaneously rather than making a choice between competing candidates in each race. The straight-ticket option, no doubt, strengthens the parties. [Texas uses nonpartisan ballots in some local elections].   
NO SPECIAL INTEREST
The Supremes, who are among those elected on partisan ballots in Texas, collectively conclude that the election system critic who brought the underlying suit in Dallas County was no different from any other Mr. Joe Public, and that he did not satisfy the requirements for tax-payer standing under existing precedent either. Holding that the citizen had no special interest, the justices render judgment for the election official who defended the status quo.  
  
OPINION EXCERPT
  
Don Venable seeks to enjoin Dallas County from identifying candidates’ political party affiliations and providing a “straight-party” option on general election ballots. We must decide whether Venable has standing to pursue these claims. Because Venable has no interest distinct from that of the general public and has not established taxpayer standing under Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 179 (Tex. 2001), we reverse in part the court of appeals’ judgment and render judgment dismissing Venable’s claims against Secretary of State Hope Andrade.
  
Venable has not pleaded facts showing that measurable and significant public funds were being spent on the activity he challenges, and thus, has failed to affirmatively demonstrate taxpayer standing. Because Venable has no interest distinct from that of the public generally, and his claims fall outside the narrow taxpayer exception to the bar against generalized grievances, he lacks the requisite and particularized stake to warrant standing. Accordingly, we grant the petition for review, and without hearing oral argument, we reverse in part the court of appeals’ judgment and render judgment dismissing Venable’s claims against Andrade. TEX. R. APP. P. 59.1, 60.2(c).

SOURCE: TEXAS SUPREME COURT - Honorable Hope Andrade v. Don Veneable, No. 11-0008  (Tex. May 18, 2012) Petition for Review from Dallas County; 5th district (051000303CV, ___ SW3d ___, 111510)
 
PER CURIAM OPINION

Thursday, May 3, 2012

Capacity to sue and standing are distinct, and also have different procedural implications

 
CORPORATIONS’ CAPACITY TO SUE VS. STANDING
   
A corporation's authority to bring a lawsuit on a claim is an issue of capacity, not standing to sue. See El T. Mexican Rests., Inc. v. Bacon, 921 S.W.2d 247, 249 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied) (capacity is a party's legal authority to go into court to prosecute or defend a suit). A party must challenge a corporation's capacity to file suit by a verified denial under rule 93. See id.; see also Sixth RMA Partners v. Sibley, 111 S.W.3d 46, 56 (Tex. 2003) (“When capacity is contested, Rule 93 requires that a verified plea be filed unless the truth of the matter appears of record.”).
  
SOURCE:  DALLAS COURT OF APPEALS - 05-10-00725-CV – 4/27/12
  
Gutierrez's first three issues claim TWLF could not recover on the contract because its corporate privileges were forfeited by the secretary of state in 2004 for non-payment of franchise taxes. Gutierrez did not raise these arguments in a verified denial under rule 93; instead he raised them for the first time in a supplemental motion for new trial filed more than thirty days after the judgment was signed. Thus, the issues were not timely raised in the trial court and are not preserved for appeal. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 93(1), (2), (6), 329b(b); Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).
   
Gutierrez argues this is an issue of standing to sue and can be raised at any time. We disagree.

Gutierrez v. Wright Lawfirm, PLLC, No. 05-10-00725-CV, 2012 WL 1898950 (Tex. App.-Dallas Apr. 27, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.)