Showing posts with label (Tex. 2012). Show all posts
Showing posts with label (Tex. 2012). Show all posts

Friday, May 18, 2012

Tim Cole Act Compensation Claim for Innocents who ended up in jail as a result of wrongful conviction - In re Allen (Tex. 2012)

 
In re Billy Frederick Allen (Tex. May 18, 2012) (State Comptroller ordered to pay compensation to exonerated former inmate, who was wrongfully convicted and imprisoned)

This Supreme Court decision is bound to be all over the news nationwide. Here is the essence of what the statutory remedy for exonerated former inmates is all about [excerpt from today’s opinion], followed by a similar snippet from an earlier Tex. Sup. Ct. case, and the text of the relevant legislation, as codified in the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.   
CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION FOR WRONGFUL IMPRISONMENT
Under the Tim Cole Act (Act or TCA), formerly known as the Texas Wrongful Imprisonment Act, a wrongfully imprisoned person may seek compensation from the state for the period of wrongful imprisonment. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 103.001(a). A person is entitled to compensation if the person 1) has served in whole or in part a sentence in prison under the laws of this state, and 2) has been granted habeas relief on a court determination that he is “actually innocent” of the crime for which he was sentenced.2 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 103.001(a)(1), (a)(2)(B). Additionally, the applicant’s supporting documentation must clearly indicate on its face that the person is entitled to compensation. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 103.051 (b-1).
For the reasons that follow, we hold that Billy Frederick Allen is entitled to compensation under the TCA, and we conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus.
[…]
The statute’s namesake, Timothy Cole, was convicted and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison for aggravated sexual assault. He maintained his innocence, but died of an asthma attack in 1999 while incarcerated. He was exonerated years later by DNA evidence, and in 2010, Governor Rick Perry granted him the state’s first posthumous pardon. See In re Smith, 333 S.W.3d 582, 583 n.1 (Tex. 2011); Act of May 27, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 180, § 1, 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 523 (naming the Act after Tim Cole).
[…]
We do not read the Court of Criminal Appeals’ opinion as indicating it failed to find actual innocence as to Allen’s conviction. Therefore, because the Court of Criminal Appeals granted habeas relief on a Schlup claim, Allen’s court order clearly indicates on its face that relief was based on actual innocence.
[…]
The petition for writ of mandamus is conditionally granted, and we instruct the Comptroller to comply with this opinion and compensate Allen under the terms of the Tim Cole Act. A writ of mandamus will issue only upon the failure to do so.
SOURCE: SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS – No. 10-0886 – 5/18/2012
EXCERPT FROM PRIOR TEXAS  SUPREME COURT OPINION
Under the Texas Wrongful Imprisonment Act, which is now known as the Tim Cole[1] Act, a wrongfully-imprisoned person may seek compensation from the state for the period of wrongful imprisonment. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE § 103.001(a). Application is made to the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, who is authorized to determine eligibility and the amount owed to the claimant. Id. § 103.051(b). The amount owed is determined by multiplying a fixed amount, currently set at $80,000 per year, by the period of wrongful imprisonment. Id. § 103.052(a)(1). In calculating the wrongful-imprisonment period, the Act excludes any period for which the claimant was serving a concurrent sentence. Id. § 103.001(b).
SOURCE: TEXAS SUPREME COURT - In re Smith, 333 S.W.3d 582, 585 (Tex. June 21, 2011).
STATUTUORY TEXT:
CIVIL PRACTICE AND REMEDIES CODETITLE 5. GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITYCHAPTER 103. COMPENSATION TO PERSONS WRONGFULLY IMPRISONED 
SUBCHAPTER A. ELIGIBILITY; NOTICE OF ELIGIBILITY
Sec. 103.001.  CLAIMANTS ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION AND HEALTH BENEFITS COVERAGE.  (a)  A person is entitled to compensation if:(1)  the person has served in whole or in part a sentence in prison under the laws of this state; and(2)  the person:(A)  has received a full pardon on the basis of innocence for the crime for which the person was sentenced;(B)  has been granted relief in accordance with a writ of habeas corpus that is based on a court finding or determination that the person is actually innocent  of the crime for which the person was sentenced; or(C)  has been granted relief in accordance with a writ of habeas corpus and:(i)  the state district court in which the charge against the person was pending has entered an order dismissing the charge; and(ii)  the district court's dismissal order is based on a motion to dismiss in which the state's attorney states that no credible evidence exists that inculpates the defendant and, either in the motion or in an affidavit, the state's attorney states that the state's attorney believes that the defendant is actually innocent of the crime for which the person was sentenced.(b)  A person is not entitled to compensation under Subsection (a) for any part of a sentence in prison during which the person was also serving a concurrent sentence for another crime to which Subsection (a) does not apply. (c)  If a deceased person would be entitled to compensation under Subsection (a)(2) if living, including a person who received a posthumous pardon, the person's heirs, legal representatives, and estate are entitled to lump-sum compensation under Section 103.052.(d)  Subject to this section, a person entitled to compensation under Subsection (a) is also eligible to obtain group health benefit plan coverage through the Texas Department of Criminal Justice as if the person were an employee of the department.  This subsection does not entitle the person's spouse or other dependent or family member to group health benefit plan coverage.  Coverage may be obtained under this subsection for a period of time equal to the total period the claimant served for the crime for which the claimant was wrongfully imprisoned, including any period during which the claimant was released on parole or to mandatory supervision or required to register under Chapter 62, Code of Criminal Procedure.  A person who elects to obtain coverage under this subsection shall pay a monthly contribution equal to the total amount of the monthly contributions for that coverage for an employee of the department.(e)  Notwithstanding Section 103.053(c), annuity payments may be reduced by an amount necessary to make the payments required by Subsection (d), and that amount shall be transferred to an appropriate account as provided by the comptroller by rule to fund that coverage.
Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 959, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985.  Amended by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1488, Sec. 1, eff. June 15, 2001.Amended by: Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 180, Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2009.Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 698, Sec. 2, eff. June 17, 2011.Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 1107, Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2011.Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 1107, Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2011.
Sec. 103.002.  NOTICE TO WRONGFULLY IMPRISONED PERSON.  (a)  In this section:(1)  "Department" means the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.(2)  "Penal institution" has the meaning assigned by Article 62.001, Code of Criminal Procedure.(3)  "Wrongfully imprisoned person" has the meaning assigned by Section 501.091, Government Code, as added by Chapter 1389 (S.B. 1847), Acts of the 81st Legislature, Regular Session, 2009.(b)  The department shall provide to each wrongfully imprisoned person information, both orally and in writing, that includes:(1)  guidance on how to obtain compensation under this chapter; and(2)  a list of and contact information for nonprofit advocacy groups, identified by the department, that assist wrongfully imprisoned persons in filing claims for compensation under this chapter.(c)  The department must provide the information required under Subsection (b):(1)  at the time of the release of the wrongfully imprisoned person from a penal institution; or(2)  as soon as practicable after the department has reason to believe that the person is entitled to compensation under Section 103.001(a).
Added by Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 698, Sec. 3, eff. June 17, 2011.
Sec. 103.003.  LIMITATION ON TIME TO FILE.  A person seeking compensation under this chapter must file an application with the comptroller for compensation under Subchapter B not later than the third anniversary of the date:(1)  the person on whose imprisonment the claim is based received a pardon as provided by Section 103.001(a)(2)(A);(2)  the person's application for a writ of habeas corpus was granted as provided by Section 103.001(a)(2)(B); or(3)  an order of dismissal described by Section 103.001(a)(2)(C) was signed.
Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 959, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985.  Amended by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1488, Sec. 1, eff. June 15, 2001.Amended by: Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 180, Sec. 3, eff. September 1, 2009.Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 698, Sec. 4, eff. June 17, 2011.
SUBCHAPTER B. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
Sec. 103.051.  APPLICATION PROCEDURE.(a)  To apply for compensation under this subchapter, the claimant must file with the comptroller's judiciary section:(1)  an application for compensation provided for that purpose by the comptroller;(2)  a verified copy of the pardon, court order, motion to dismiss, and affidavit, as applicable, justifying the application for compensation;(3)  a statement provided by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and any county or municipality that incarcerated the person on whose imprisonment the claim is based in connection with the relevant sentence verifying the length of incarceration;(4)  if applicable, a statement from the Department of Public Safety verifying registration as a sex offender and length of registration;(5)  if applicable, a statement from the Texas Department of Criminal Justice verifying the length of time spent on parole; and(6)  if the claimant is applying for compensation under Section 103.052(a)(2), a certified copy of each child support order under which child support payments became due during the time the claimant served in prison and copies of the official child support payment records described by Section 234.009, Family Code, for that period.(b)  The comptroller shall determine:(1)  the eligibility of the claimant;  and(2)  the amount of compensation owed to an eligible claimant.(b-1)  In determining the eligibility of a claimant, the comptroller shall consider only the verified copies of documents filed under Subsection (a)(2).  If the filed documents do not clearly indicate on their face that the person is entitled to compensation under Section 103.001(a)(2), the comptroller shall deny the claim.  The comptroller's duty to determine the eligibility of a claimant under this section is purely ministerial.(c)  The comptroller must make a determination of eligibility and the amount owed as required by Subsection (b) not later than the 45th day after the date the application is received.(d)  If the comptroller denies the claim, the comptroller must state the reason for the denial.  Not later than the 30th day after the date the denial is received, the claimant must submit an application to cure any problem identified.  Not later than the 45th day after the date an application is received under this subsection, the comptroller shall determine the claimant's eligibility and the amount owed.(e)  If the comptroller denies a claim after the claimant submits an application under Subsection (d), the claimant may bring an action for mandamus relief.(f)  To apply for coverage through the Texas Department of Criminal Justice under Section 103.001(d), the claimant must file with the department:(1)  an application for coverage provided for that purpose by the department; and(2)  a statement by the comptroller that the comptroller has determined the claimant to be eligible for compensation under this subchapter.
Added by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1488, Sec. 1, eff. June 15, 2001.  Amended by Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 1310, Sec. 1, eff. June 20, 2003.Amended by: Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1190, Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2007.Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1388, Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2007.Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 87, Sec. 5.003, eff. September 1, 2009.Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 180, Sec. 4, eff. September 1, 2009.Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 698, Sec. 5, eff. June 17, 2011.Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 1107, Sec. 3, eff. September 1, 2011.
Sec. 103.052.  LUMP-SUM COMPENSATION.  (a)  A person who meets the requirements of Section 103.001 is entitled to compensation in an amount equal to:(1)  $80,000 multiplied by the number of years served in prison, expressed as a fraction to reflect partial years; and(2)  compensation for child support payments owed by the person on whose imprisonment the claim is based that became due and interest on child support arrearages that accrued during the time served in prison but were not paid.(b)  A person who, after serving a sentence in a Texas prison for which the person is entitled to compensation under Subsection (a)(1), was released on parole or required to register as a sex offender under Chapter 62, Code of Criminal Procedure, is entitled to compensation in an amount equal to $25,000 multiplied by the number of years served either on parole or as a registered sex offender, expressed as a fraction to reflect partial years.(c)   The amount of compensation under Subsection (a)(2) to which a person is entitled shall be paid on the person's behalf in a lump-sum payment to the state disbursement unit, as defined by Section 101.0302, Family Code, for distribution to the obligee under the child support order.
Added by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1488, Sec. 1, eff. June 15, 2001.Amended by: Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1190, Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2007.Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 180, Sec. 5, eff. September 1, 2009.
Sec. 103.053.  ANNUITY COMPENSATION.  (a)  A person entitled to compensation under Section 103.001(a) is entitled to annuity payments, based on a present value sum equal to the amount to which the person is entitled under Sections 103.052(a)(1) and (b).(b)  The annuity payments under this section are payable in equal monthly installments for the life of the claimant and must be based on a five percent per annum interest rate and other actuarial factors within the discretion of the comptroller.(c)  The annuity payments may not be accelerated, deferred, increased, or decreased.  The applicant may not sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber, or anticipate the payments, wholly or partly, by assignment or otherwise.
Added by Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 180, Sec. 6, eff. September 1, 2009.
Sec. 103.054.  PAYMENT OF CERTAIN TUITION AND FEES.  If requested by the claimant before the seventh anniversary of the relevant date described by Section 103.003, tuition for up to 120 credit hours, including tuition charged under Section 54.0513, Education Code, or any other law granting an educational institution discretion to set the tuition rate, and any mandatory fees associated with attendance at the institution, charged by a career center or public institution of higher education shall be paid on behalf of the claimant.
Added by Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 180, Sec. 6, eff. September 1, 2009.Amended by: Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 698, Sec. 6, eff. June 17, 2011.
SUBCHAPTER C.  FEES
Sec. 103.101.  FEES LIMITED; PREREQUISITES TO FEE AGREEMENT.  (a)  A person, including an attorney, may not charge or collect a fee for preparing, filing, or curing a claimant's application under Section 103.051 unless the fee is based on a reasonable hourly rate.(b)  An attorney may enter into a fee agreement with a claimant for services related to an application under Section 103.051 only after the attorney has disclosed in writing to the claimant the hourly rate that will be charged for the services.(c)  An attorney may not collect a fee for preparing, filing, or curing a claimant's application under Section 103.051 before a final determination is made by the comptroller that the claimant is eligible or ineligible for compensation under this chapter.
Added by Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 698, Sec. 7, eff. June 17, 2011.
Sec. 103.102.  SUBMISSION OF FEE REPORT.  (a) Together with an application for compensation under this chapter or not later than the 14th day after the date the application or cured application is filed, a person seeking payment for preparing, filing, or curing the application must file a fee report with the comptroller's judiciary section.(b)  A fee report under this section must include:(1)  the total dollar amount sought for fees;(2)  the number of hours the person worked preparing, filing, or curing the application; and(3)  the name of the applicant.(c)  A fee report under this section is public information subject to Chapter 552, Government Code.
Added by Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 698, Sec. 7, eff. June 17, 2011.
SUBCHAPTER D. PAYMENTS AND LIMITATIONS
Sec. 103.151.  ADMINISTRATIVE PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION.  (a)  The comptroller shall make the compensation due a claimant under Section 103.052 and the lump-sum payment, if any, to be paid to the state disbursement unit, as defined by Section 101.0302, Family Code, under Subchapter B, to the extent that funds are available and appropriated for that purpose, not later than the 30th day after the date the comptroller grants the application.  A claim for lump-sum compensation payable under Section 103.052(a) or (b) shall survive the death of the claimant in favor of the heirs, legal representatives, and estate of the claimant.(b)  The comptroller shall begin making annuity payments to a claimant under Section 103.053(a) on the first anniversary of the date of payment of the compensation due under Section 103.052.(c)  If appropriated funds are insufficient to pay the amount due a claimant and the amount to be paid to the state disbursement unit, as defined by Section 101.0302, Family Code, money shall be paid under the procedure described by Section 103.152.
Added by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1488, Sec. 1, eff. June 15, 2001.Amended by: Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1190, Sec. 5, eff. September 1, 2007.Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 180, Sec. 7, eff. September 1, 2009.
Sec. 103.152.  PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION.  (a)  Not later than November 1 of each even-numbered year, the comptroller shall provide a list of claimants entitled to payment under Subchapter B and the amounts due for each claimant to the governor, the lieutenant governor, and the chair of the appropriate committee in each house of the legislature so that the legislature may appropriate the amount needed to pay the amount owed to each claimant and the amount to be paid to the state disbursement unit, as defined by Section 101.0302, Family Code, on the claimant's behalf.(b)  Not later than September 1 of the year in which an appropriation under this chapter has been made by the legislature, the comptroller shall pay the required amount to each claimant and the state disbursement unit, as defined by Section 101.0302, Family Code.(c)  Repealed by Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 180, Sec. 12(3), eff. September 1, 2009.
Added by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1488, Sec. 1, eff. June 15, 2001.Amended by: Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1190, Sec. 6, eff. September 1, 2007.Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 180, Sec. 8, eff. September 1, 2009.Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 180, Sec. 12(3), eff. September 1, 2009.
Sec. 103.153.  EMPLOYEES NOT LIABLE AFTER PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION.  (a)  In this section, "employee" and "governmental unit" have the meanings assigned by Section 101.001.(b)  A person who receives compensation under this chapter may not bring any action involving the same subject matter, including an action involving the person's arrest, conviction, or length of confinement, against any governmental unit or an employee of any governmental unit.
Added by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1488, Sec. 1, eff. June 15, 2001.
Sec. 103.154.  TERMINATION OF PAYMENTS.  (a)  Except as provided by Subsection (c), compensation payments to a person under this chapter terminate if, after the date the person becomes eligible for compensation under Section 103.001, the person is convicted of a crime punishable as a felony.  Compensation payments terminate under this subsection on the date of the subsequent conviction.(b)  Annuity payments to a person under Section 103.151(b) terminate on the date of the person's death.  Any payments scheduled to be paid after that date are credited to the state and may not be paid to any other person, including the person's surviving spouse, heirs, devisees, or beneficiaries under the person's will, or to the person's estate.(c)  This section does not apply to compensation for child support payments and interest on child support arrearages to be paid on a person's behalf under this chapter to the state disbursement unit, as defined by Section 101.0302, Family Code.
Added by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1488, Sec. 1, eff. June 15, 2001.Amended by: Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1190, Sec. 7, eff. September 1, 2007.Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 180, Sec. 9, eff. September 1, 2009.

[No] Legal standing to complain: Texas Supreme Court nixes citizen's suit to challenge balloting process that favors political parties as unconstitutional

 
SUPREMES SAY WOULD-BE ELECTION-SYSTEM REFORMER WHO TOOK A STAND AGAINST PARTISAN BALLOTING DID NOT HAVE STANDING
    
Honorable Hope Andrade v. [Average Joe tax-paying Citizen] Don Veneable (Tex. May 18, 2012)
  
In an anonymous per curiam opinion, the Texas Supreme Court this morning disposed of a Dallas resident's constitutional challenge to partisan identification of candidates and straight-ticket voting option on the general election ballot on standing grounds. The challenged feature of the general election ballot process allows voters to vote for all candidates of the same political party simultaneously rather than making a choice between competing candidates in each race. The straight-ticket option, no doubt, strengthens the parties. [Texas uses nonpartisan ballots in some local elections].   
NO SPECIAL INTEREST
The Supremes, who are among those elected on partisan ballots in Texas, collectively conclude that the election system critic who brought the underlying suit in Dallas County was no different from any other Mr. Joe Public, and that he did not satisfy the requirements for tax-payer standing under existing precedent either. Holding that the citizen had no special interest, the justices render judgment for the election official who defended the status quo.  
  
OPINION EXCERPT
  
Don Venable seeks to enjoin Dallas County from identifying candidates’ political party affiliations and providing a “straight-party” option on general election ballots. We must decide whether Venable has standing to pursue these claims. Because Venable has no interest distinct from that of the general public and has not established taxpayer standing under Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 179 (Tex. 2001), we reverse in part the court of appeals’ judgment and render judgment dismissing Venable’s claims against Secretary of State Hope Andrade.
  
Venable has not pleaded facts showing that measurable and significant public funds were being spent on the activity he challenges, and thus, has failed to affirmatively demonstrate taxpayer standing. Because Venable has no interest distinct from that of the public generally, and his claims fall outside the narrow taxpayer exception to the bar against generalized grievances, he lacks the requisite and particularized stake to warrant standing. Accordingly, we grant the petition for review, and without hearing oral argument, we reverse in part the court of appeals’ judgment and render judgment dismissing Venable’s claims against Andrade. TEX. R. APP. P. 59.1, 60.2(c).

SOURCE: TEXAS SUPREME COURT - Honorable Hope Andrade v. Don Veneable, No. 11-0008  (Tex. May 18, 2012) Petition for Review from Dallas County; 5th district (05‑10‑00303‑CV, ___ SW3d ___, 11‑15‑10)
 
PER CURIAM OPINION

Friday, April 20, 2012

Punitive Damages may be awarded in Sabine-Pilot Wrongful Termination-of-Employment Suit -- Safeshred, Inc. v. Martinez (Tex. April 20, 2012)

    
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IN WRONGFUL TERMINATION SUIT UNDER SABINE-PILOT EXCEPTION TO EMLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE 
   
Texas Supreme Court says, in opinion released today (Friday April, 20, 2012), that punitive damages are available in successful wrongful termination claim by employee fired for refusing to perform an illegal act because it is a tort, not a contract claim, and exemplary damages are available in tort cases as a general rule. The Court nevertheless reverses the court of appeals’ affirmance of exemplary damages in the case under review, finding that there was not legally sufficient evidence of malice in the employee's termination by his employer.  
      

Safeshred, Inc. v. Martinez (Tex. April 20, 2012)

   
EXCERPTS FROM THE OPINION BY JUSTICE LEHRMANN
   
  
This case requires us to clarify the nature and scope of the cause of action for wrongful termination of an employee for refusing to perform an illegal act that we recognized in Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985). In particular, we must determine whether a plaintiff in a Sabine Pilot action may recover punitive damages, and if so, what must be shown as a prerequisite for those damages.

We agree with the court of appeals’ conclusion that a Sabine Pilot cause of action sounds in tort and allows punitive damages upon proper proof. However, because we hold that Martinez failed to present legally sufficient evidence of malice relating to his firing, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment insofar as it affirms the award of exemplary damages.

 […]

A. The Availability of Punitive Damages

 1. Tort or contract

The first question we must answer is whether a Sabine Pilot claim sounds in tort or contract, because the answer to that question will decide whether exemplary damages are recoverable. While exemplary or punitive damages may generally be awarded for torts involving malicious or grossly negligent conduct, they are not available for breach of contract claims. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563, 571 (Tex. 1981). Safeshred argues that the employment relationship is inherently contractual, and that Sabine Pilot essentially supplements that relationship with an implied contractual provision preventing discharge for refusal to perform an illegal act. Martinez, on the other hand, notes that every Texas case to categorize a Sabine Pilot claim has labeled it a tort,2 and that comparisons to other statutory wrongful termination causes of action support that characterization.

Courts outside of Texas are split on whether a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, like a Sabine Pilot claim, sounds in tort or contract. Compare Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 841 (Wis. 1983) (contract), and Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551 (N.H. 1974) (same), with Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1089 (Wash. 1984) (en banc) (tort), and Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 631 (Haw. 1982) (same).

We conclude that such claims sound in tort.

Apart from Sabine Pilot, this Court has steadfastly adhered to the employment-at-will doctrine. See, e.g., Ed Rachal Found. v. D’Unger, 207 S.W.3d 330, 332 (Tex. 2006). In that vein, we have consistently refused to expand Sabine Pilot beyond the “narrow exception” we recognized in that case. See id. at 332–33 (refusing to expand Sabine Pilot liability to cover whistleblower actions not already authorized by statute); Winters, 795 S.W.2d at 725 (same). Safeshred argues that, in order to maintain that narrow interpretation, we must call a Sabine Pilot claim a contract claim.

But, in fact, the opposite is true. To say the cause of action sounds in contract, we would need to drastically alter our view of the at-will employment relationship in general, rather than merely recognize a narrow exception to the at-will doctrine. E.g., Physio GP, Inc. v. Naifeh, 306 S.W.3d 886, 887-888 (Tex. App.—Houston [14 Dist.] 2 2010, no pet.); Draker v. Schreiber, 271 S.W.3d 318, 323 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, no pet.) (citing Louis v. Mobil Chem. Co., 254 S.W.3d 602, 610 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, pet. denied)); Miller v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 229 S.W.3d 358, 373 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.); see also Garcia v. Sun Belt Rentals, Inc., 310 F.3d 403, 404 (5th Cir. 2002); Hanold v. Raytheon Co., 662 F. Supp. 2d 793, 803 (S.D. Tex. 2009).

This is so because, to say that Sabine Pilot created an implied contractual provision would presume, in the first place, that there is a contract between at-will employees and their employers in which to place an implied provision. We have never recognized such a proposition. See, e.g., Montgomery Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Brown, 965 S.W.2d 501, 502–03 (Tex. 1998) (treating the implied employment contract urged by petitioners as a significant departure from at-will employment); Garcia v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 310 F.3d 403, 404 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[N]o Texas court has held that an at-will employment relationship constitutes an oral contract . . . .”). On the contrary, we have long held firm to the principle that, in Texas, an at-will employee may be fired for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all. Brown, 965 S.W.2d at 502. And where the promise of continued employment is illusory, it cannot form the basis of an enforceable contract. Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs., L.P. v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644, 660–61 (Tex. 2006) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 77 cmt. a (1981); 3 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 7.7 (4th ed. 1992)). It would be inconsistent to call Sabine Pilot an implied contractual restriction on a relationship that is not even contractual. Cf. City of Midland v. O’Bryant, 18 S.W.3d 209, 216 (Tex. 2000) (“[A] contractual limitation [like a duty of good faith and fair dealing] would afford more rights to the plaintiffs than at-will employees possess.”).

Instead, we conclude that Sabine Pilot claims are not contractual in nature, but sound in tort, providing a remedy when an employee refuses to comply with an employer’s directive to violate the law and is subsequently fired for that refusal. This approach is consistent with our treatment of a statutory workers’ compensation retaliation claim (another narrow exception to employment-at-will), which we have labeled an intentional tort. See Cont’l Coffee Prods. Co. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d  444, 453 (Tex. 1996) (discussing TEX. LAB. CODE § 451.001). It also gives due attention to the fact that Sabine Pilot liability stems not from an agreement between employer and employee (the subject of contract), but from legislatively expressed public policies embodied in the criminal law. For these reasons, we hold that a Sabine Pilot claim sounds in tort, not in contract.

2. Punitive Damages for This Tort

Safeshred contends that, even if we recognize a Sabine Pilot claim as a tort, allowing exemplary or punitive damages would constitute an expansion of the claim that we did not intend in Sabine Pilot, and one better left to the Legislature. But punitive damages are generally available for common law torts so long as the traditional prerequisites are met: a finding of actual damages, Doubleday & Co. v. Rogers, 674 S.W.2d 751, 754 (Tex. 1984); and outrageous, malicious, or otherwise reprehensible conduct, Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 16 (Tex. 1994). Rather than expanding the claim, allowing punitive damages would merely avoid arbitrarily excluding a category of damages that is otherwise presumptively available. In a similar situation, where the Legislature only specified the availability of “reasonable damages” for workers’ compensation retaliation claims, we interpreted that term to include punitive damages, which “have long been seen as an important policy tool and a valid measure of damages.” Azar Nut Co. v. Caille, 734 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Tex. 1987) (citing Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470, 474–75 (Tex. 1984)). Here, we face similar policy concerns to those presented by the statute at issue in Azar Nut (deterring employers from wrongfully terminating employees), as well as the additional objective of deterring violations of the criminal law. We hold that, in the proper case, Sabine Pilot plaintiffs may recover any reasonable tort damages, including punitive damages.
  


SOURCE: TEXAS SUPREME COURT - Safeshred, Inc. v. Louis Martinez, III (Tex. April 20, 2012)(Opinion by Lehrmann) (on petition for review from the Austin Court of Appeals)
LEGAL TERMS AND LINKS: Sabine Pilot Exception to Employment at Will Doctrine  Employment at Will

Does slander per se require proof of damages? Salinas v. Salinas, No. 11-0131 (Tex. April 20, 2012)

  
DAMAGES IN PER SE DEFAMATION CASE - If not merely nominal, what amount? 

Texas Supreme Court has this to say in case in which it reversed a $30,000 appellate court judgment in favor of defamation plaintiff this morning:   

“Our law presumes that statements that are defamatory per se injure the victim’s reputation and entitle him to recover general damages, including damages for loss of reputation and mental anguish.” Bentley v. Bunton, 94 S.W.3d 561, 604 (Tex. 2002) (plurality opinion). However, even if some mental anguish can be presumed in cases of defamation per se, and if we assume the Telemundo statement was defamatory per se, the law does not presume any particular amount of damages beyond nominal damages.2

2 We need not decide whether Norberto would have been entitled to nominal damages for slander per se if he had requested them. He did not request such an award from the trial court and did not request that the jury be instructed to award at least nominal damages. We note, however, that courts have not resolved this issue in an entirely consistent manner. See Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc. v. Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. 219 S.W.3d 563, 584–85 n.22 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. denied) (discussing cases

See Denton Publ’g Co. v. Boyd, 448 S.W.2d 145, 147 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1969) (holding that a plaintiff in a libel per se case is entitled to nominal damages and “such actual damages as might be shown to be the proximate result of the publication”), aff’d, 460 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. 1970); Tex. Disposal Sys., 219 S.W.3d at 584 (stating that in cases of defamation per se, “the amount of actual general damages remains a question for the jury”); Adolf Coors Co. v. Rodriguez, 780 S.W.2d 477, 488 (Tex. App—Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied) (noting that under presumption of damages applicable to libel per se, damages “are within the jury’s discretion, are purely personal, and cannot be measured by any fixed rule or standard”); Bradbury v. Scott, 788 S.W.2d 31, 39 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989), writ denied) (holding, in case of libel per se, “where the amount of the actual damages is not capable of definite ascertainment, and prima facie liability is established, the determination of the amount is necessarily lodged in the discretion of the jury”); Freeman v. Schwenker, 73 S.W.2d 609, 611 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1934, no writ) (same).

SOURCE: TEXAS SUPREME COURT – Salinas v. Salinas, No. 11-0131 – 4/20/12

There is, in short, no jury verdict in support of an award of damages of $30,000 or any other amount for the Telemundo statement, and the court of appeals could not sua sponte make its own award of damages. See Freeman, 73 S.W.2d at 611 (holding, in libel per se case, that “[i]t is a well-settled rule that, where a case is submitted to a jury . . . judgment of the court must be rendered upon the verdict returned”); see also Osterberg v. Peca, 12 S.W.3d 31, 55 (Tex. 2000) (holding that appellate court could not review sufficiency of evidence under a legal standard that was not submitted to the jury if no party objected to failure to charge jury under the standard). Even if mental anguish can be presumed, the determination of the amount of mental anguish damages is an inquiry left to the finder of fact. We therefore agree with Maria that the court of appeals was not authorized to award $30,000 in mental anguish damages for the Telemundo statement, without a damages finding by the jury supporting such an award.

SOURCE: SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS – Maria Ester Salinas vs. Norberto Salinas, No. 11-0131 – 4/20/12