Contract Ambiguity as a defensive claim

AMBIGUOUS CONTRACT ARGUMENT [Claim that contract sued on is ambiguous as a defense to enforcement of the contract as a matter of law without parol evidence] “Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law that must be decided by examining the contract as a whole in light of the circumstances present when the contract was entered.” Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. New Ulm Gas, Ltd., 940 S.W.2d 587, 589 (Tex. 1996). Only where a contract is ambiguous may a court consider the parties’ interpretation and “admit extraneous evidence to determine the true meaning of the instrument.” Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Penn. v. CBI Indus., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam). When is a contract provision ambiguous, and when not? A contract is not ambiguous merely because the parties have conflicting interpretations of the contract. Columbia Gas, 940 S.W.2d at 589. A contract is ambiguous only when its meaning is uncertain or it is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning. Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983). Question of law vs. question of fact precluding summary judgment When a contract is not ambiguous, the construction of the written instrument is a question of law for the court that is reviewed de novo. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Texas Utilities Elec. Co., 995 S.W.2d 647, 650-51 (Tex. 1999); Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 393. SOURCE: 04-08-00745-CV (9/9/09) (San Antonio Court of Appeals)

Mutual Mistake as a Contract Defense

AVOIDANCE OF CONTRACT BASED ON MUTUAL MISTAKE When parties to an agreement have contracted under a misconception or ignorance of a material fact, the agreement will be avoided under the doctrine of mutual mistake. Williams v. Glash, 789 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Tex. 1990). When can the affirmative defense of mutual mistake be invoked? To prove a mutual mistake, the evidence must show that both parties were acting under the same misunderstanding of the same material fact when the agreement was executed. Seymour v. American Engine & Grinding Co., 956 S.W.2d 49, 58 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied). “The doctrine of mutual mistake must not routinely be available to avoid the results of an unhappy bargain.” Williams v. Glash, 789 S.W.2d 261, 265 (Tex. 1990). SOURCE: 04-08-00745-CV (9/9/09) (San Antonio Court of Appeals) (defense of mutual mistake not conclusively established)

No viable civil conspiracy claim in the absence of underlying tort

CIVIL CONSPIRACY

To establish civil conspiracy, the appellant must show that the appellees had a meeting of the minds on an object or course of action, and that one of the members committed an unlawful, overt act in furtherance of the object or course of action. Tri v. J.T.T., 162 S.W.3d 552, 556 (Tex. 2005).


FAILURE OF UNDERLYING CAUSE OF ACTION DOOMED CIVIL CONSPIRACY CLAIM

But since conspiracy is a derivative tort, [Plaintiff] must show that the appellees were also liable for some underlying tort in order to prevail on this claim. See Baty v. ProTech Ins. Agency, 63 S.W.3d 841, 864 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (citing Trammell Crow Co. No. 60 v. Harkinson, 944 S.W.2d 631, 635 (Tex. 1997)). Because we have already affirmed the trial court's summary judgment as to both tortious interference and breach of fiduciary duty, [Plaintiff] is without a tort claim upon which to base a cause of civil conspiracy. Therefore we overrule [Plaintiff's] issue on the summary judgment against his conspiracy claim.

SOURCE: 14-08-00093-CV (9/29/09) (Houston Court of Appeals - 14th Dist.)

The elements of tortious interference [not spelled tortuous]

PROVING A TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE CLAIM (interference with contract) A party alleging tortious interference must prove that a contract subject to interference exists; that the alleged act of interference was willful and intentional; that the willful and intentional act proximately caused damage; and that actual damage or loss occurred. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Fin. Review Servs., Inc., 29 S.W.3d 74, 77 (Tex. 2000); Four Bros. Boat Works, Inc. v. Tesoro Petroleum Cos., 217 S.W.3d 653, 668 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). SOURCE: 14-08-00093-CV (9/29/09) (Fourteenth Court of Appeals in Houston)

UDJA claim: When is declaratory judgment appropriate?

CLAIM FOR DECLARATION(S) UNDER THE UNIFORM DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT (UDJA) What is the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA) and what purpose does it serve? The Texas Declaratory Judgment Act is a remedial statute the purpose of which is to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.002(b) (Vernon 2008); Bonham State Bank v. Beadle, 907 S.W.2d 465, 467 (Tex.1995); WesternGeco, L.L.C. v. Input/Output, Inc., 246 S.W.3d 776, 781 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.). [Courts] must construe and administer this statute liberally. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.002(b); Bonham State Bank, 907 S.W.2d at 467. A court of record, acting within its jurisdiction, has power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. WesternGeco, L.L.C., 246 S.W.3d at 781. Limitations on Availability of Declaratory Relief A declaratory judgment is appropriate only if a justiciable controversy exists as to the rights and status of the parties and the controversy will be resolved by the declaration sought. Bonham State Bank, 907 S.W.2d at 467; WesternGeco, L.L.C., 246 S.W.3d at 781. For a justiciable controversy to exist, there must be a real and substantial controversy involving a genuine conflict of tangible interests and not merely a theoretical dispute. Bonham State Bank, 907 S.W.2d at 467; WesternGeco, L.L.C., 246 S.W.3d at 781. SOURCE: 14-08-00093-CV (9/29/09) (Fourteenth Court of Appeals in Houston)

Eviction Lingo: Forcible Detainer Action Explained

WHAT IS A FORCIBLE DETAINER ACTION? A forcible detainer action, which is a special proceeding governed by particular statutes and rules, "was created to provide a speedy, simple, and inexpensive means for resolving the question of the right to possession of premises." Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 709 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.); see Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 24.001-24.011 (Vernon 2000 & Supp. 2008); Tex. R. Civ. P. 738-755. Generally, the "sole issue" in the suit is "who has the right to immediate possession of the premises." Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709; see Tex. R. Civ. P. 746. "To prevail in a forcible detainer action, a plaintiff is not required to prove title, but is only required to show sufficient evidence of ownership to demonstrate a superior right to immediate possession." Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709. The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, however, specifically allow a claim for rent to be brought with a forcible detainer action. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 738; Carlson's Hill Country Beverage L.C. v. Westinghouse Road Joint Venture, 957 S.W.2d 951, 954 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, no pet.). SOURCE: 09-08-00422-CV (8/27/09) (Beaumont Court of Appeals)

Elements of Adverse Possession Claim

ADVERSE POSSESSION To support a claim for adverse possession, a claimant must prove: (1) actual possession of the disputed property; (2) under a claim of right; and (3) that is adverse or hostile to the claim of another person and that it was consistently and continuously so for the duration of the statutory period. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.021 (Vernon 2002); Martin v. McDonnold, 247 S.W.3d 224, 235 (Tex. App.--El Paso 2006, no pet.); Cherokee Water Co. v. Freeman, 145 S.W.3d 809, 817 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2004, pet. denied). The test for hostility is whether acts performed by the claimant on the land, and the use made of the land, were of such a nature and character as to reasonably notify the true owner of the land that a hostile claim was being asserted to the property. Martin, 247 S.W.3d at 235; Cherokee Water Co., 145 S.W.3d at 817. Possession must not only be actual, but also visible, continuous, notorious, distinct, hostile (i.e., adverse), and of such a character as to indicate unmistakably an assertion of a claim of exclusive ownership in the occupant. Martin, 247 S.W.3d at 235; Cherokee Water Co., 145 S.W.3d at 817. "Possession of land by adverse claimants who began their entry upon the disputed land with the permission of the record owner cannot establish adverse possession unless and until they give notice of the hostile nature of their possession. Wright v. Wallace, 700 S.W.2d 269, 271 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Commander v. Winkler, 67 S.W.3d 265, 269 (Tex. App.--Tyler 2001, pet. denied). "Where the original use of the land in controversy is permissive, it is presumed that the continued use thereof is also permissive in the absence of notice to the true owner of the repudiation of such permissive use and the assertion of an adverse claim." Commander, 67 S.W.3d at 270. SOURCE: 04-08-00171-CV (7/8/09) (San Antonio Court of Appeals)

Trespass on Land: Elements of the Tort

WHAT IS TRESPASS TO REAL PROPERTY? Trespass to real property occurs when a person enters another's land without consent. Rankin v. FPL Energy, LLC, 266 S.W.3d 506, 509 n.4 (Tex. App.--Eastland 2008, pet. denied); Wilen v. Falkenstein, 191 S.W.3d 791, 797-98 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied). SUING FOR DAMAGES FOR TRESPASS ON LAND To recover damages, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) the plaintiff owns or has a lawful right to possess real property; (2) the defendant entered the plaintiff's land and the entry was physical, intentional, and voluntary; and (3) the defendant's trespass caused injury to the plaintiff. Rankin, 266 S.W.3d at 509 n.4; Wilen, 191 S.W.3d at 798. SOURCE: 04-08-00171-CV (7/8/09) (San Antonio Court of Appeals)

Res Judicata: Purpose and Elements of this Affirmative Defense

WHAT IS RES JUDICATA AND WHAT PURPOSE DOES THE DOCTRINE SERVE? Res judicata, or claims preclusion, prevents the relitigation of a claim or cause of action that has been finally adjudicated, as well as related matters that, with the use of diligence, should have been litigated in the prior suit. Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp. ex rel. Sunbelt Fed. Sav., 837 S.W.2d 627, 628-29 (Tex. 1992). "The doctrine is intended to prevent causes of action from being split, thus curbing vexatious litigation and promoting judicial economy." Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Valero Energy Corp., 997 S.W.2d 203, 207 (Tex. 1999) (citing Barr, 837 S.W.2d at 629). WHAT ESTABLISHES THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF RES JUDICATA? The elements of res judicata are: (1) a prior final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) identity of parties or those in privity with them; and (3) a second action based on the same claims that were raised or could have been raised in the first action. Igal v. Brightstar Info. Tech. Group, Inc., 250 S.W.3d 78, 86 (Tex. 2008); Amstadt v. U. S. Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 652 (Tex. 1996). "The scope of res judicata is not limited to matters actually litigated; the judgment in the first suit precludes a second action by the parties and their privies not only on matters actually litigated, but also on causes of action or defenses which arise out of the same subject matter and which might have been litigated in the first suit." Barr, 837 S.W.2d at 630 (quoting Tex. Water Rights Comm'n v. Crow Iron Works, 582 S.W.2d 768, 771-72 (Tex. 1979) (emphasis added)). To determine what constitutes the subject matter of a suit, we analyze the factual matters that make up the gist of the complaint, without regard to the form of action; any cause of action which arises out of those same facts should, if practicable, be litigated in the same lawsuit. Barr, 837 S.W.2d at 630; Crow Iron Works, 582 S.W.2d at 772. SOURCE: 04-07-00727-CV (7/8/09) (San Antonio Court of Appeals)

Res judicata as affirmative defense and bar to re-litigation of claims

THE CONCEPT OF RES JUDICATA AND THE LEGAL EFFECT WHEN IT APPLIES "Res judicata precludes relitigation of claims that have been finally adjudicated, or that arise out of the same subject matter and that could have been litigated in the prior action." Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 652 (Tex. 1996). HOW TO ESTABLISH THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF RES JUDICATA To prove res judicata, a party must establish: (1) a prior final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) identity of parties or those in privity with them; and (3) a subsequent action based on the same claims as were raised or could have been raised in the first action. Id. PARTY STATUS OR IN PRIVITY WITH A PARTY IN THE PRIOR SUIT As a general rule, people are not bound by a judgment in a suit to which they were not parties. Id. Josephina does not contend that Jesus and Norma were parties to the prior divorce suit but rather that they were in privity with Juan and, therefore, are bound by the trial court's judgment in the prior suit. WHEN DOES PRIVITY APPLY? The Texas Supreme Court has said that people can be in privity in three ways: (1) by controlling the action even if they are not parties to it; (2) by having their interests represented by a party to the action; or (3) by acting as "successors in interest, deriving their claims through a party to the prior action." Id. at 653. PRIVITY DEFINED "Privity connotes those who are in law so connected with a party to a judgment as to have such an identity of interest that the party to the judgment represented the same legal right." Maxson v. Travis Co. Rent Account, 21 S.W.3d 311, 316 (Tex. App.--Austin 1999, pet. dism'd). SOURCE: 04-08-00394-CV (7/29/09) (San Antonio Court of Appeals)

Breach of Fiduciary Duty: The Damages Element

Establishing Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Generally, to recover for the breach of a fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must show: 1) the existence of a fiduciary duty, 2) a breach of the duty, 3) causation, and 4) damages. See Abetter Trucking Co. v. Arizpe, 113 S.W.3d 503, 508 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). When, however, the plaintiff seeks fee restitution or benefit disgorgement, he need not prove actual damages. Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 240 (Tex. 1999); Alavi v. MCI Worldcom Network Services, Inc., 2007 WL 274565, at *3 (Tex. App.-Beaumont, Feb. 1, 2007, pet. denied). Because Richard's claim for breach of fiduciary duty sought damages as his remedy, he was required to prove them. See Alavi, 2007 WL 274565, at *3; Lee v. Lee, 47 S.W.3d 767, 780-81 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied); Longaker v. Evans, 32 S.W.3d 725, 733 n.2 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. withdrawn).

ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE ON DAMAGES PROVED FATAL TO CLAIM

Cynthia's no-evidence motion asserted there was no evidence that: 1) she owed a fiduciary duty to Richard, or 2) that damages resulted from the alleged breach. Richard's response contended that a DTA creates a fiduciary relationship by its "very nature," that such beneficiaries typically are unaware of delinquencies until foreclosure proceedings have begun, that beneficiaries often (as in his case) do not have adequate funds to bring the note current, and that the unavoidable foreclosure results in a "major hit" on the beneficiary's credit. Richard further argued that he did not have to prove damages to recover on his breach of fiduciary claim. On appeal, Richard maintains this Court should determine whether a DTA creates a fiduciary duty. We need not reach the issue concerning whether Cynthia owed Richard a duty. Even if we assumed that Cynthia owed Richard a fiduciary duty, which she disputes, Richard is required to have presented evidence raising a genuine fact issue on his damages. See Grant, 73 S.W.3d 215. Because Richard failed to present any evidence proving that he had been damaged, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to Cynthia on Richard's breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim. We overrule issue two. Having overruled both of Richard's issues, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

SOURCE: 07-08-08833 CV (7/16/09)

The Discovery Rule: When does it apply?

THE DISCOVERY RULE: WHEN CAN IT BE INVOKED TO GOOD EFFECT TO AVOID LIMITATIONS BAR ?

"The discovery rule has been applied in limited categories of cases to defer accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff knew or, exercising reasonable diligence, should have known of the facts giving rise to a cause of action." HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881, 886 (Tex. 1998). The application of the discovery rule is generally limited to those cases where the nature of the injury is inherently undiscoverable and the evidence of the injury is objectively verifiable. Id. The applicability of the discovery rule is determined categorically, i.e., not based on whether the particular injury in the case at hand may not have been discovered but whether the injury is of a type that generally is discoverable by the exercise of reasonable diligence. Id.

INHERENTLY UNDISCOVERABLE INJURY & EXISTENCE OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 

A variation to the inherently undiscoverable element arises when applying the discovery rule to a fiduciary relationship. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453, 456 (Tex. 1996); see also S.V. v. R.V. , 933 S.W.2d 1, 8 (Tex. 1996). In the fiduciary context, "a person to whom a fiduciary duty is owed is either unable to inquire into the fiduciary's actions or unaware of the need to do so." S V., 933 S.W.2d at 8. When a trustee breaches its duty to a beneficiary, the nature of the injury is considered inherently undiscoverable because of the fiduciary nature of the relationship. See id. However, the person owed a fiduciary relationship still must exercise reasonable diligence "when the fact of misconduct becomes [so] apparent it can no longer be ignored." (1) Id.; see also Computer Assocs. Int'l, 918 S.W.2d at 456; Slay v. Burnett Trust, 187 S.W.2d 377, 394 (Tex. 1945); G. Prop. Mgmt., Ltd. v. Multivest Fin. Servs. of Tex., Inc., 219 S.W.3d 37, 48-49 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2006, no pet.).

FIDUCIARY DUTY CONTEXT

Because Jones owed fiduciary responsibilities to Polk Mechanical, the inherently undiscoverable requirement for applying the discovery rule is satisfied. See S V., 933 S.W.2d at 8. Moreover, the injury in this case is objectively verifiable as it can be objectively established through bank records and cancelled checks. See HECI Exploration Co., 982 S.W.2d at 886. Accordingly, we hold the discovery rule applied to Polk Mechanical's claim against Jones, and Jones was required to conclusively negate its application to be entitled to summary judgment. See Pustejovsky, 35 S.W.3d at 646.

NEGATING THE DISCOVERY RULE 

To conclusively negate the discovery rule, Jones was required to prove as a matter of law that there was no genuine issue of fact about when Polk Mechanical discovered or should have discovered the nature of the injury. See Potter, 137 S.W.3d at 704. Inquiries involving the discovery rule usually entail questions for the trier of fact because when a plaintiff knew or should have known of an injury is generally a fact question. Childs v. Haussecker, 974 S.W.2d 31, 44 (Tex. 1998); Cadle Co. v. Wilson, 136 S.W.3d 345, 352 (Tex. App.--Austin 2004, no pet.). However, if reasonable minds could not differ about the conclusion to be drawn from the facts in the record, the start of the limitations period may be determined as a matter of law. Childs, 974 S.W.2d at 44; Cadle Co., 136 S.W.3d at 352; Zacharie v. U.S. Nat. Resources, Inc., 94 S.W.3d 748, 753 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2002, no pet.).

 SOURCE: 04-08-00509-CV (7/1/09) (San Antonio Court of Appeals)

Lawsuit involving a trust: Statute of Limitations and Accrual

Civil Actions involving Trusts: Statute of Limitations and the Discovery Rule

A suit involving a trust is governed by the four-year statute of limitations. Hicks v. Hoover, 422 S.W.2d 613, 614 (Tex. Civ. App.--Waco 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The statute of limitations begins to run when the all assets have been distributed. See In re Estate of McGarr, 10 S.W.3d 373, 376 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied). The discovery rule, however, tolls the running of the statute of limitations until the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the nature of the injury. Houston Endowment, Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 972 S.W.2d 156, 159 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.). In order for the discovery rule to apply, the injury must be inherently undiscoverable and objectively verifiable. Id.

SOURCE: SAN ANTONIO COURT OF APPEALS - 04-08-00601-CV (7/8/09)

Successful Bill of Review entails retrial of claim(s) on which underlying judgment was based

   
BILL OF REVIEW DEFINED - PROCEDURE EXPLAINED

“A bill of review is an independent equitable action brought by a party to a former action seeking to set aside a judgment, which is no longer appealable or subject to motion for new trial.” Baker v. Goldsmith, 582 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex. 1979). The judgment may be set aside “for sufficient cause.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(f); Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 406. The complainant files a petition “to invoke the equitable powers of the court.” Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 408; In re K.M.S., 68 S.W.3d 61, 66 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001), pet. denied, 91 S.W.3d 331 (Tex. 2002) (per curiam).

ELEMENTS OF PROOF FOR BILL OF REVIEW TO VACATE PRIOR JUDGMENT

Generally, the bill of review complainant must prove “‘(1) a meritorious defense to the cause of action alleged to support the judgment, (2) which he was prevented from making by the fraud, accident or wrongful act of the opposite party, (3) unmixed with any fault or negligence of his own.’” Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 406–07 (quoting Alexander v. Hagedorn, 148 Tex. 565, 568–69, 226 S.W.2d 996, 998 (1950)).

EFFECT OF TRIAL COURT'S GRANT OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT IN A BILL-OF- REVIEW PROCEEDING 
 
If the complainant establishes prima facie proof of a meritorious defense, the court conducts a trial at which the merits of the underlying issue are effectively relitigated. Caldwell v. Barnes, 154 S.W.3d 93, 98 (Tex. 2004); Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 409. During the bill of review trial, “the parties . . . revert to their original status as plaintiff and defendant with the burden on the original plaintiff to prove his or her case.” Caldwell, 154 S.W.3d at 98; accord Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 407–08. The bill of review defendant—the original plaintiff—must prove, and may offer evidence to support, “his original cause of action.” Meece v. Moerbe, 631 S.W.2d 729, 729 (Tex. 1982) (citing Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 409). At the end of the proceeding, if the fact-finder decides the complainant (the original defendant) has proved his case to set aside the judgment, the trial court may vacate the prior judgment. See Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 409. And if the bill of review defendant (the plaintiff in the original proceeding) proves his original case, the trial court may “substitute a new judgment which properly adjudicates the entire controversy.” In re J.B.A., 127 S.W.3d 850, 851 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.); cf. Jordan v. Jordan, 907 S.W.2d 471, 472 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam) (citing Tesoro Petrol. v. Smith, 796 S.W.2d 705, 705 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam)).

SOURCE: 04-09-00040-CV (8/31/09) (San Antonio Court of Appeals)

EQUITABLE RELIEF: What is a Bill of Review in Texas Courts?

  
A Bill of Review is not exactly a substantive cause of action, but nevertheless a means by which a court may grant EQUITABLE RELIEF (setting aside a default judgment that is no longer appealable). The Bill of Review, and its elements, thus fit within the scope of this blawg. 

THE NATURE OF A BILL OF REVIEW AND REQUIREMENTS FOR A SUCCESSFUL PETITION IN A BILL-OF-REVIEW SUIT: 
 
A bill of review is an independent equitable proceeding brought by a party to a former action who seeks to set aside a judgment that is no longer appealable or subject to a challenge by a motion for new trial. Caldwell v. Barnes, 154 S.W.3d 93, 96 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam).
 
ELEMENTS OF BILL OF REVIEW

To prevail, a bill of review plaintiff must prove: (1) a meritorious defense to the cause of action upon which the judgment is based, (2) which he or she was prevented from making by the fraud, accident, or wrongful act of the opposing party or official mistake, (3) unmixed with any fault or negligence on his or her own part. Caldwell, 154 S.W.3d at 96; Baker v. Goldsmith, 582 S.W.2d 404, 406-07 (Tex. 1979).
 
Additionally, bill of review relief is available only if a party has exercised due diligence in pursuing all adequate legal remedies. Wembley Inv. Co. v. Herrera, 11 S.W.3d 924, 927 (Tex. 1999). This due diligence requirement is distinct from the three bill of review elements and must be established before a complainant is entitled to seek bill of review relief. Narvaez, 127 S.W.3d at 321. “The inquiry traditionally used to determine whether a party has been diligent is whether the litigant and his counsel used such care as that which prudent and careful men would ordinarily use in their own cases of equal importance.” In the Interest of A.L.H.C., 49 S.W.3d 911, 916 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pet. denied). 
 
SOURCE: 04-09-00198-CV (9/23/09) (San Antonio Court of Appeals) (trial court's order granting bill of review reversed because petitioner did not exercise available remedies, i.e., direct appeal).

Default on Installment Payment Plan: SoL and accrual of claim for breach of a contract that requires payments at regular intervals

    
ACCRUAL OF DEBT CLAIM WHEN CONTRACT REQUIRES PERIODIC PAYMENTS: EACH MISSED PAYMENT DATE TRIGGERS RUNNING OF LIMITATIONS SEPARATELY
 
A four-year statute of limitations applies to contract actions. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.004 (Vernon 2002). A breach of contract claim accrues at the time of breach. Stine v. Stewart, 80 S.W.3d 586, 592 (Tex. 2002). When recovery is sought on an obligation payable in installments, the statute of limitations runs against each installment from the time it becomes due. Intermedics, Inc. v. Grady, 683 S.W.2d 842, 845 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Thus, a suit for the breach of a contract requiring payment in periodic installments may include all payments due within the four-year statute of limitations period, even if the initial breach was beyond the limitations period. Recovery of any payment more than four years overdue is barred. Hollander v. Capon, 853 S.W.2d 723, 726-27 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied).

RELATED TERMS: Retail Installment Contract, financing, closed-ended consumer loan requiring monthly payments in equal amounts, monthly payment-due dates, missing monthly loan repayment, payment schedule 

SOURCE: 05-08-00458-CV (9/18/09) (Dallas Court of Appeals)

Fraud Cause of Action under Texas Law

  
WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTS OF FRAUD?

"The elements of fraud are a material misrepresentation, which was false, and which was either known to be false when made or was asserted without knowledge of the truth, which was intended to be acted upon, which was relied upon, and which caused injury." DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 688 (Tex. 1990).
  
HOW DOES FRAUD DIFFER FROM FAILURE TO PERFORM CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATION?
 
A promise to do an act in the future is actionable fraud when made with the intention, design and purpose of deceiving, and with no intention of performing the act. See Spoljaric v. Percival Tours, Inc., 708 S.W.2d 432, 434 (Tex. 1986).

SOURCE: 09-08-00296-CV (8/27/09)

The essential elements of his claim of fraud against the [defendants] were: (1) the [defendants] made a false representation to [plaintiff]; (2) the representation was material; (3) when the [defendants] made the representation, they knew the representation was false; (4) the [defendants] made the representation with the intent that [plaintiff] act on it; (5) [Plaintiff] relied on the representation; and (6) the representation caused [plaintiff] injury. Ernst & Young v. Pacific Mut. Life. Ins. Co., 51 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex. 2001).

SOURCE: 07-08-0213-CV (9/11/09)

Proving a conversion claim in Texas (as to personal property)

HOW DO YOU ESTABLISH THE ELEMENTS OF TEXAS COMMON-LAW CONVERSION CLAIM?

 "To prove a claim for personal property-conversion, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the plaintiff owned or legally possessed the property or was entitled to its possession; (2) the defendant unlawfully and without authorization assumed and exercised dominion and control over the property to the exclusion of, or inconsistent with, the plaintiff's ownership rights; (3) the plaintiff demanded the property's return; and (4) the defendant refused to return it." Small v. Small, 216 S.W.3d 872, 877 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2007, pet. denied). ). SOURCE: 09-08-00433-CV (8/27/09) (Beaumont Court of Appeals)

RELATED CAUSE OF ACTION: STATUTORY CAUSES OF ACTION FOR CIVIL THEFT: TEXAS THEFT LIABILITY ACT

Illegal Contract Defense

ILLEGALITY AS AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO BREACH-OF-CONTRACT CLAIM The validity of a contract is generally a question of law. Farah v. Mafrige & Kormanik, P.C., 927 S.W.2d 663, 678 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ). ILLEGAL CONTRACT DEFINED - VOID CONTRACTS An illegal contract is one in which the parties undertake what the law forbids. Franklin v. Jackson, 847 S.W.2d 306, 309 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1992, writ denied). A contract to do a thing which cannot be performed without a violation of the law is void. Id. Because the contract violates the law, it imposes no legal obligation on the parties. Miller v. Long-Bell Lumber Co., 148 Tex. 160, 222 S.W.2d 244, 246 (Tex. 1949); Franklin, 847 S.W.2d at 309. However, a contract which could have been performed in a legal manner will not be declared void simply because it may have been performed in an illegal manner. Franklin, 847 S.W.2d at 309, citing Lewis v. Davis, 145 Tex. 468, 199 S.W.2d 146, 148-49 (1947); Wade v. Jones, 526 S.W.2d 160, 162-63 (Tex.Civ.App.--Dallas 1975, no writ). PRESUMPTION OF LEGALITY - BURDEN OF PROOF TO SHOW ILLEGALITY The law presumes that contracts are legal, and the burden to prove illegality is on the party asserting it, in this case, Appellants. See Franklin, 847 S.W.2d at 310. Unless the face of the contract shows it is illegal, the party asserting illegality must present evidence demonstrating the illegality before a court may declare the contract void. See Lewis, 199 S.W.2d at 149; Franklin, 847 S.W.2d at 310. SOURCE: 08-07-00071-CV (7/29/09)

What is required to win a breach of contract case?

PROVING AND COLLECTING DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT To prevail on his breach of contract claim, [Plaintiff] was required to prove: (1) the existence of a valid contract; (2) performance or tendered performance by [Plaintiff]; (3) breach of contract by the [Defendants]; and (4) damages sustained as a result of the breach. Paragon General Contractors, Inc. v. Larco Const., Inc., 227 S.W.3d 876, 882 (Tex.App.–Dallas 2007, no pet.); Valero Marketing & Supply Co. v. Kalama Int’l, 51 S.W.3d 345, 351 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). Conner’s response does not point to evidence of any of these elements. SOURCE: 07-08-0213-CV (9/11/09)

The Parol Evidence Rule: Not just a rule about admissibility of testimony, extraneous evidence

THE NATURE OF THE PAROL (NOT PAROLE) EVIDENCE RULE The parol evidence rule is a rule of substantive contract law, not evidence. Hubacek v. Ennis State Bank, 159 Tex. 166, 317 S.W.2d 30, 31 (1958); DeClaire v. G & B McIntosh Family Limited Partnership, 260 S.W.3d 34, 45 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet. h.). STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL We review parol evidence questions de novo, as questions of law. DeClaire, 260 S.W.3d at 45. PAROL EVIDENCE AND INTERGRATION OR MERGER CLAUSE IN CONTRACT When the parties have concluded a valid, integrated agreement, the parol evidence rule precludes enforcement of a prior or contemporaneous inconsistent agreement. Edascio, L.L.C. v. NextiraOne L.L.C., 264 S.W.3d 786, 796 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. filed); ISG State Operations, Inc. v. National Heritage Insurance Company, 234 S.W.3d 711, 719 (Tex.App.--Eastland 2007, pet. denied). The execution of a written contract presumes that all prior negotiations and agreements relating to the transaction have been merged into the written contract. Edascio, 264 S.W.3d at 796; ISG State Operations, 234 S.W.3d at 719. Consequently, the agreement will be enforced as written and cannot be added to, varied, or contradicted by parol evidence. Edascio, 264 S.W.3d at 796; ISG State Operations, 234 S.W.3d at 719. The parol evidence rule is particularly applicable when the written contract contains a recital that it contains the entire agreement between the parties or a similarly-worded merger provision. Edascio, 264 S.W.3d at 796. Evidence that violates the rule is incompetent and without probative force, and cannot properly be given legal effect. Garner v. Fidelity Bank, N.A., 244 S.W.3d 855, 859 (Tex.App.--Dallas 2008, no pet.). Parol evidence may be admissible to show collateral, contemporaneous agreements that are consistent with the underlying agreement. Gary E. Patterson & Associates, P.C. v. Holub, 264 S.W.3d 180, 197 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied); DeClaire, 260 S.W.3d at 45. But this exception does not permit parol evidence that varies or contradicts either the express terms or the implied terms of the written agreement. Gary E. Patterson, 264 S.W.3d at 197; DeClaire, 260 S.W.3d at 45. A collateral agreement is one the parties might naturally make separately, i.e., one not ordinarily expected to be embodied in, or integrated with the written agreement and not so clearly connected with the principal transaction as to be part and parcel of it. Garner, 244 S.W.3d at 859. An agreement is integrated if the parties intended a writing to be a final and complete expression of agreed terms. Morgan Buildings and Spas, Inc. v. Humane Society of Southeast Texas, 249 S.W.3d 480, 486 (Tex.App.--Beaumont 2008, no pet.). The inclusion of a merger or integration clause does not conclusively establish that the written contract is fully integrated. Id. A fully integrated written agreement is a final and complete expression of all the terms agreed upon by the parties. Id. A partially integrated agreement is a final and complete expression of all the terms addressed in that written agreement, but is not a final and complete expression of all the terms the parties have agreed upon. Id. A court considers the surrounding circumstances in determining whether, and to what degree, an agreement is integrated. Id. SOURCE OF ALL SNIPPETS: 08-07-00071-CV (7/29/09)

The Discovery Rule as a limitations tolling tool for breach of fiduciary duty claim in Texas

  
SOL FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY & DISCOVERY RULE

The statute of limitations for a claim for breach of fiduciary duty is four years from the day the cause of action accrued. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.004(a)(5) (Vernon 2002). The discovery rule defers the accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff knows, or by exercising reasonable diligence, should know of the facts giving rise to the claim. Barker v. Eckman, 213 S.W.3d 306, 311-12 (Tex. 2006).
 
WHEN CAN THE DISCOVERY RULE BE INVOKED? 
 
For the discovery rule to apply, the injury must be inherently undiscoverable and objectively verifiable. Id. at 312; Via Net v. TIG Ins. Co., 211 S.W.3d 310, 313 (Tex. 2006). Injuries that arise from a breach of fiduciary duty are generally considered inherently undiscoverable. S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 8 (Tex. 1996); Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453, 456 (Tex. 1996). However, once the fiduciary's misconduct becomes apparent, the claimant cannot ignore it, regardless of the fiduciary nature of the relationship. S.V., 933 S.W.2d at 8; see also Computer Assocs., 918 S.W.2d at 456.
 
SOURCE: 09-08-00398-CV (7/16/09) (Beaumont Court of Appeals)
 

Asserting Fraudulent Concealment to Counter Affirmative Defense of Limitations (SoL)

FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT AS COUNTER-DEFENSE TO LIMITATIONS DEFENSE A defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the affirmative defense of limitations by conclusively proving all the elements of the defense as a matter of law. Pustejovsky v. Rapid-American Corp., 35 S.W.3d 643, 646 (Tex. 2000). This requires conclusively proving the date the cause of action accrued. See Rubio, 185 S.W.3d at 846. When a defendant conclusively establishes a limitations defense and the plaintiff resists summary judgment by asserting fraudulent concealment, the plaintiff has the burden to present evidence raising a fact issue with respect to its claim. Am. Petrofina, Inc. v. Allen, 887 S.W.2d 829, 830 (Tex. 1994). The elements of fraudulent concealment are 1) the existence of the underlying tort, 2) the defendant's knowledge of the tort, 3) the defendant's use of deception to conceal the tort, and 4) the plaintiff's reasonable reliance on the deception. Malone v. Sewell, 168 S.W.3d 243, 252 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, pet. denied). SOURCE: 09-08-00433-CV (8/27/09) (Beaumont Court of Appeals)

Can a prevailing defendant recover attorney's fees in a breach-of-contract suit?

  
    
PREVAILING DEFENDANT MAY RECOVER ATTORNEY'S FEES IF AUTHORIZED BY CONTRACT
 
The trial court's decision to award attorney's fees and post-judgment interest is supported by the contract, which states:

If the services of an attorney are retained and/or if any action at law or in equity is brought to enforce or interpret the provisions of this Agreement or to collect any monies due hereunder, the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees together with interest thereon at the highest rate provided by law in addition to any other relief to which he may be entitled at law or in equity.

WHAT DOES 'PREVAILING' MEAN? WHAT DOES IT TAKE TO QUALIFY AS PREVAILING PARTY FOR FEE RECOVERY PURPOSES?

A "prevailing party" is a party who successfully prosecutes the action or successfully defends against it, prevailing on the main issue, even if not to the extent of its original contention. See Flagship Hotel, Ltd. v. City of Galveston, 117 S.W.3d 552, 564 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2003, pet. denied); Dear v. City of Irving, 902 S.W.2d 731, 739 (Tex. App.--Austin 1995, writ denied).
 
Because ADC successfully defended against Hertzberg's suit by obtaining summary judgment on his claims, ADC is the prevailing party. See Robbins v. Capozzi, 100 S.W.3d 18, 27 (Tex. App.--Tyler 2002, no pet.). Thus, [Defendant] is entitled to "reasonable attorney's fees together with interest thereon" as provided by the contract. Accordingly, the trial court's decision to grant [Defendant's] requests for attorney's fees and post-judgment interest was not an abuse of discretion.

SOURCE: THIRD COURT OF APPEALS IN AUSTIN - 03-07-00072-CV - 9/11/2009  

Reasonable Attorney's Fees in Texas State Court: The Arthur Andersen Factors (not Anderson) per 1997 Texas Supreme Court Opinion

2019-05-21 UPDATE: See subsequent Texas Supreme Court opinion in Roormoos adopting the Lodestar framework for attorney fee valuation in the fee-shifting context in state courts. Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, No. 16-0006 (Tex. Apr. 26, 2019).

Also see commentary on new atttorney fee-shifting precedent: Texas Supreme Court Tells Bar and Bench to Follow the Lodestar: Post-Opinion Amicus Brief in Rohrmoos v. UTSW, No.16-0006 (Tex. 2019) (June 7, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3402040
Also see commentary on Hill v. Shamoun & Norman: Recovery of Attorney's Fees in the Absence of a Contract in Texas: Amicus Curiae Brief on Behalf of the Public in Hill v. Shamoun & Norman, LLP, 544 SW3d 724 (Tex. 2018) (January 23, 2018). 
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3152327 

FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT IN AWARDING REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES (Arthur Andersen Factors) 

Regarding the amount of attorney's fees the trial court awarded, there are several factors a fact finder should consider in determining the reasonableness of a fee. ⁽²⁾ Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. 1997). The factors include:

(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill required to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or uncertainty of collection before the legal services have been rendered.

Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. 1997).

STANDARD OF REVIEW OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDS ON APPEAL

We review a trial court's decision to either grant or deny attorney's fees under an abuse-of-discretion standard, and we review the amount of attorney's fees awarded under a legal-sufficiency standard. See Ridge Oil Co., Inc. v. Guinn Invs., Inc., 148 S.W.3d 143, 163 (Tex. 2004); Aaron Rents, Inc. v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 212 S.W.3d 665, 671 (Tex. App.--Austin 2006, no pet.).
A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts without reference to any guiding rules and principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985). To determine whether a trial court abused its discretion, we must determine whether the trial court's action was arbitrary or unreasonable. Id. at 242.

Because we review the amount of attorney's fees awarded under a legal-sufficiency review, we must view the evidence in a light that tends to support the disputed finding and disregard evidence and inferences to the contrary. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Canchola, 121 S.W.3d 735, 739 (Tex. 2003). If more than a scintilla of evidence supports the challenged finding, the legal-sufficiency challenge must fail. Id.

SOURCE: AUSTIN COURT OF APPEALS - 03-07-00072-CV - 9/11/09 

THE SEMINAL CASE FROM 1997 WRITTEN BY JUSTICE CORNYN, WHO LATER BECAME A U.S. SENATOR REPRESENTING TEXAS  

945 S.W.2d 812 (1997) 

ARTHUR ANDERSEN & CO., Petitioner,

v.

PERRY EQUIPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.

No. 95-0444.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued March 19, 1997.

Decided May 16, 1997.

Ben Taylor, Dallas, Thomas C. Godbold, Houston, for Petitioner.

Christopher B. Allen, Michael P. Cash, James W. Paulsen, Houston, for Respondent.

CORNYN, Justice.

We withdraw our opinion of January 10, 1997, and substitute the following in its place. The parties' motions for rehearing are overruled.

In this accounting malpractice case, Perry Equipment Corporation (PECO) sued the accounting firm of Arthur Andersen for a faulty audit, which PECO relied on to purchase another company, Maloney Pipeline Systems. The audit favorably reported Maloney's financial condition when, in fact, the company was suffering substantial losses. Fourteen months after the sale, Maloney filed for bankruptcy. PECO sued for violations of the Deceptive Trade Practice Act, fraud, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, gross negligence, and breach of implied warranty. Based on the jury's verdict, the trial court rendered judgment for PECO. The court of appeals affirmed. 898 S.W.2d 914.

We address three issues presented by Arthur Anderson's application for writ of error. First, Arthur Andersen challenges PECO's consumer status because Maloney, rather than PECO, actually paid for the audit. Second, Arthur Andersen claims that the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the correct measure of damages. Third, Arthur Andersen contests the attorney's fees award, arguing that the percentage of recovery method is not a proper measure of attorney's fees under the DTPA, and that even if such fees were recoverable, no evidence supports the award. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

I

When PECO, a successful manufacturer of oil filters used in compressors for gas pipelines, decided to expand its business into the gas metering field, it looked into acquiring Maloney Pipeline Systems, one of three United States companies in the liquid metering market. In the mid-1980s, PECO began negotiating with Maloney's owner, Ramteck II. As a condition of the sale, PECO required an audit of Maloney's financial statements. Maloney retained Arthur Andersen to conduct the audit. Maloney eventually provided PECO financial statements audited by Arthur Andersen. The statements showed Maloney to be a profitable business. Relying upon this information, on August 23, 1985, PECO purchased the Maloney stock from Ramteck II, Inc. for $4,088,237.

Soon after the purchase, Maloney began to show signs of serious financial decline. For example, three months after the sale, Maloney ran out of cash and required a $400,000 advance from PECO to continue operating. PECO also attempted other emergency financial measures, but to no avail. Fourteen months after the sale, Maloney filed bankruptcy. PECO presented uncontradicted evidence at trial that the purchase price for Maloney was a total loss from which PECO realized no return and which PECO wrote off.

PECO's experts testified that Arthur Andersen's audit contained serious errors and otherwise failed to follow acceptable auditing procedures. One of the most significant errors, the evidence showed, was the failure to verify that contracts Maloney reported as complete were in fact complete or that Maloney's estimates of costs and percentage of completion for ongoing contracts were accurate. Maloney later incurred substantial losses on these contracts. One expert testified that the audit was one of the worst he had ever seen. Another expert, an auditing professor, stated that if a student submitted the work, he would have given the student a failing grade.

The jury found Arthur Andersen 51 percent at fault and PECO 49 percent at fault. The jury also found that Arthur Andersen had committed fraud, DTPA violations, and breach of warranty, but that it was not liable for negligent misrepresentation or gross negligence. The jury assessed damages of $5,449,468, including the $4,088,237 PECO paid for Maloney and $1,361,231 for other expenses incurred by PECO in its attempt to salvage the company. PECO elected to recover under the DTPA. The trial court credited Arthur Andersen with the two million dollars that Ramteck II had already paid PECO in settlement, and then awarded PECO a total of $9,297,601.20, including damages, prejudgment interest, DTPA additional damages, attorney's fees, and costs.

II

Arthur Andersen first contends that PECO is not a "consumer," a prerequisite to recovery under the DTPA. The DTPA defines a consumer as one "who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease, any goods or services." TEX. BUS. & COM.CODE § 17.45(4). In determining whether a plaintiff is a consumer, our focus is on the plaintiff's relationship to the transaction. Amstadt v. United States Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 650 (Tex. 1996). As a condition of sale, PECO insisted that Maloney provide audited financial statements. Maloney hired Arthur Andersen for this specific purpose. PECO then relied on those statements in reaching its decision to purchase Maloney. Under these circumstances, we hold that PECO sought and acquired Arthur Andersen's services.

The next question is whether PECO sought and acquired these services by purchase or lease, inasmuch as it did not pay for the audit. Our decision in Kennedy v. Sale, 689 S.W.2d 890 (Tex.1985), controls this issue. There, we held that the DTPA does not require the consumer to be an actual purchaser or lessor of the goods or services, as long as the consumer is the beneficiary of those goods or services. Id.

The Texas Society of Certified Public Accountants, as amicus curiae, argues that a stock purchaser should not be considered a consumer simply because the corporation paid for an audit for the purchaser's benefit because virtually every external audit benefits third parties. Thus, any stock purchaser who reviews audited financial statements could bring a DTPA claim against the auditor.[1] Our holding is not so broad. In this case, the audit was rendered in connection with the sale of Maloney and was specifically required by PECO and intended to benefit PECO. Arthur Andersen was aware that PECO had required the audit and would rely on its accuracy and knew the specific purpose for which it was conducted. We accordingly hold that PECO is a consumer under the DTPA.

Arthur Andersen also urges us to reject PECO's consumer status based on the decision in Hand v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 889 S.W.2d 483 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied). In Hand, the plaintiff alleged that her stock broker failed to purchase certain commodity option contracts after she requested that he do so. Id. at 487-88. After deciding that a commodity option contract is a right, not a "good," under the DTPA, id. at 498, the court next considered whether the plaintiff was a consumer by virtue of her purchase of "services." The DTPA defines services as including "services furnished in connection with the sale or repair of goods." TEX. BUS. & COM.CODE § 17.45(2). The court reasoned that the omission of any reference in the definition to services in connection with the sale of something other than a good indicated that services furnished in connection with the sale of intangibles did not fall within the definition of services under the DTPA. Hand, 889 S.W.2d at 498. The court then concluded: "The key to the [consumer status] determination is whether the purchased goods or services are an objective of the transaction or merely incidental to it." Id. at 500.

We believe that Hand confirms, rather than defeats, PECO's consumer status. Arthur Andersen's audit was not merely incidental to the sale of Maloney to PECO; it was required by PECO and was central to PECO's decision to consummate the purchase. Determining Maloney's financial condition was PECO's primary objective in acquiring Arthur Andersen's services. We therefore reject Arthur Andersen's contention that Hand defeats PECO's status as a consumer under the DTPA.

III

Arthur Andersen next complains that the jury charge allowed the jury to award PECO the entire purchase price of Maloney, without instructing the jury to subtract the value of Maloney stock at the time of the sale.[2] Arthur 816*816 Andersen also contends that even if the court had properly instructed the jury, PECO failed to introduce any evidence that the stock was valueless at the time of sale, and thus failed to establish that it was entitled to the entire purchase price under either the "benefit-of-the-bargain" or the "out-of-pocket" measure of damages. PECO responds that in addition to direct damages, consequential damages are also recoverable under the DTPA. PECO thus argues that it is entitled to recover the purchase price as consequential damages.

Under the version of the DTPA in effect at the time PECO brought this action, a consumer could recover "the amount of actual damages" caused by the defendant's false, misleading, or deceptive conduct. Tex. BUS. & COM.CODE § 17.50(b)(1).[3] The amount of actual damages recoverable is "the total loss sustained as a result of the deceptive trade practice." Kish v. Van Note, 692 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Tex.1985)(citing Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 617 (Tex.1980)).

Actual damages are those damages recoverable under common law. Brown v. American Transfer & Storage Co., 601 S.W.2d 931, 939 (Tex.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1015, 101 S.Ct. 575, 66 L.Ed.2d 474 (1980). At common law, actual damages are either "direct" or "consequential." Henry S. Miller Co. v. Bynum, 836 S.W.2d 160, 163 (Tex. 1992) (Phillips, C.J., concurring); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549 (1977) (outlining measure of damages for fraudulent misrepresentation). Direct damages are the necessary and usual result of the defendant's wrongful act; they flow naturally and necessarily from the wrong. See Southwind Aviation, Inc. v. Avendano, 776 S.W.2d 734, 736 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied); Anderson Dev. Corp. v. Coastal States Crude Gathering Co., 543 S.W.2d 402, 405 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Direct damages compensate the plaintiff for the loss that is conclusively presumed to have been foreseen by the defendant from his wrongful act. See Bynum, 836 S.W.2d at 163 (Phillips, C.J., concurring); Coastal States, 543 S.W.2d at 405; Anderson, Incidental and Consequential Damages, 7 J.L. & Com. 327, 328 (1987).

Consequential damages, on the other hand, result naturally, but not necessarily, from the defendant's wrongful acts. Haynes & Boone v. Bowser Bouldin, Ltd., 896 S.W.2d 179, 182 (Tex.1995); Moore v. Anderson, 30 Tex. 224, 230 (1867). Under the common law, consequential damages need not be the usual result of the wrong, but must be foreseeable, see Mead v. Johnson Group, Inc., 615 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Tex.1981), and must be directly traceable to the wrongful act and result from it. Airborne Freight Corp., Inc. v. C.R. Lee Enters., Inc., 847 S.W.2d 289, 295 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1992, writ denied); El Paso Dev. Co. v. Ravel, 339 S.W.2d 360, 363 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Of course, foreseeability is not an element of producing cause under the DTPA. See Haynes & Boone, 896 S.W.2d at 182; Prudential Ins. v. Jefferson Assocs., 896 S.W.2d 156, 161 (Tex.1995). Still, if damages are too remote, too uncertain, or purely conjectural, they cannot be recovered. See White v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., Inc., 651 S.W.2d 260, 262 (Tex.1983); see also Bynum, 836 S.W.2d at 164 (Phillips, C.J., concurring).

Under Texas common law, direct damages for misrepresentation are measured in two ways. W.O. Bankston Nissan, Inc. v. Walters, 754 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex.1988); Leyendecker & Assocs., Inc. v. Wechter, 683 S.W.2d 369, 373 (Tex.1984). Out-of-pocket damages measure the difference between the value the buyer has paid and the value of what he has received; benefit-of-the-bargain damages measure the difference between the value as represented and the value received. Leyendecker, 683 S.W.2d at 373. Under the DTPA, a plaintiff may recover under the damage theory that provides the greater recovery. Id. Both measures of damages are determined at the time of sale. See id. at 373 (out-of-pocket damages are measured at the time of sale); see also Bullion, An Understanding of Damages Recoverable Under the DTPA, 20 ST. MARY'S L.J. 667, 670-72 (1989).

In this case, the jury was not asked to find direct damages at the time of the sale as well as consequential damages attributable to Arthur Anderson's misrepresentations. Rather, the jury was simply asked to consider the purchase price as part of the overall damages. PECO did present evidence that the purchase price was eventually a total loss. There was also evidence that Maloney was losing money at the time of the sale and continued to do so until it declared bankruptcy. What PECO did not establish, however, was how much of its loss occurred at the time of the sale and how much was attributable to subsequent events for which Arthur Anderson should bear legal responsibility. If subsequent losses were caused by Arthur Andersen's wrongful conduct and were not simply part of the risk a buyer of the business would have assumed, they may be part of PECO's consequential damages.

Subsequent losses, however, are recoverable only if the misrepresentation is a producing cause of the loss. See Haynes & Boone, 896 S.W.2d at 182. Without this limitation, an investor could shift the entire risk of an investment to a defendant who made a misrepresentation, even if the loss were unrelated to the misrepresentation. The basis of a misrepresentation claim is that the defendant's false statement induced the plaintiff to assume a risk he would not have taken had the truth been known. But to allow the plaintiff to transfer the entire risk of loss associated with his investment, even risks that the plaintiff accepted knowingly or losses that occurred through no fault of the defendant, would unfairly transform the defendant into an insurer of the plaintiff's entire investment.

Because the charge failed to instruct the jury on the proper measure of direct damages, the submission was reversible error. But, because we find some evidence that Arthur Andersen's misrepresentation was a producing cause of PECO's loss, we remand this case for a new trial. See Spencer v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., 876 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex.1994) (holding that remand is proper when defective liability question is submitted); Jackson v. Fontaine's Clinics, Inc., 499 S.W.2d 87, 90 (Tex.1973) (remanding for new trial when defective damages question submitted); Moulton v. Alamo Ambulance Serv., Inc., 414 S.W.2d 444, 449-50 (Tex.1967) (affirming remand for new trial when defective damages question submitted).

We emphasize that a plaintiff's recovery of damages is limited not only by his own evidence, but also by the defendant's evidence of the plaintiff's failure to reasonably mitigate losses or evidence of intervening causes. See Dubow v. Dragon, 746 S.W.2d 857, 860 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988, no writ); EDGAR & SALES, TEXAS TORTS & REMEDIES § 43.04[1][b]; Tschoepe et al., Aspects of Defending A Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act Claim, 20 St. Mary's L.J. 527, 561 (1989). If a plaintiff's losses are attributable to his own mistakes or factors outside either of the parties' control, the defendant may be entitled to an appropriate limiting instruction to the jury.

IV

Because we are remanding this case for a new trial, we turn now to Arthur Andersen's complaint that the trial court improperly awarded PECO attorney's fees calculated as a percentage of recovery.[4]

818*818 Attorney contingency fee contracts serve two main purposes. First, they allow plaintiffs who cannot afford to pay a lawyer up-front to pay the lawyer out of any recovery. See See, An Alternative to the Contingent Fee, 1984 UTAH L.REV. 485, 490 n. 14. Second, such contracts, because they offer the potential of a greater fee than might be earned under an hourly billing method, compensate the attorney for the risk that the attorney will receive no fee whatsoever if the case is lost. Id. The lawyer in effect lends the value of his services, which is secured by a share in the client's potential recovery. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.9 (4th ed.1992). Under some contingency fee contracts, the attorney also agrees to advance the out-of-pocket costs of the litigation. In such cases, the attorney not only risks loss of the fee, but also risks loss of actual expenditures.

Arthur Andersen complains that an award of contingency fees under a fee-shifting statute like the DTPA forces defendants to pay fees unrelated to the amount of work performed. While this is not always true, shifting these fees to the defendant presents two problems.

First, a contingent fee award based solely on evidence of a percentage fee agreement between a lawyer and client may be determined without regard to many of the factors that should be considered when determining reasonableness. The DTPA allows recovery of "reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees." TEX. BUS. & COM.CODE § 17.50(d). Factors that a factfinder should consider when determining the reasonableness of a fee include:

(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill required to perform the legal service properly;(2) the likelihood ... that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or uncertainty of collection before the legal services have been rendered.

TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.04, reprinted in TEX. GOV'T CODE, tit. 2, subtit. G app. (STATE BAR RULES, art. X, § 9); see also Ragsdale v. Progressive Voters League, 801 S.W.2d 880, 881 (Tex.1990); cf. General Motors Corp. v. Bloyed, 916 S.W.2d 949, 960-961 (Tex.1996) (discussing the relative strengths and weaknesses of the contingent fee and lodestar methods of awarding attorneys fees in the context of a court-approved class action settlement). While we do not doubt that many plaintiffs must contract for a contingent fee to secure the services of a lawyer, we do not believe that the DTPA authorizes the shifting of the plaintiff's entire contingent fee to the defendant without consideration of the factors required by the Rules of Professional Conduct. A contingent fee may indeed be a reasonable fee from the standpoint of the parties to the contract. But, we cannot agree that the mere fact that a party and a lawyer have agreed to a contingent fee means that the fee arrangement is in and of itself reasonable for purposes of shifting that fee to the defendant.

A party's contingent fee agreement should be considered by the factfinder, see Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof. Conduct 1.04(b)(8), and is therefore admissible in evidence, but that agreement cannot alone support an award of attorney's fees under Texas Business and Commerce Code section 17.50(d). See Brister, Proof of Attorney's Fees in Texas, 24 St. Mary's L.J. 313, 324 (1993). In other words, the plaintiff cannot simply ask the jury to award a percentage of 819*819 the recovery as a fee because without evidence of the factors identified in Disciplinary Rule 1.04, the jury has no meaningful way to determine if the fees were in fact reasonable and necessary.

Second, because the jury is not informed what the total amount of the judgment will be, the jury can only speculate about whether a percentage of that unknown recovery will represent a reasonable and necessary fee in that particular case. Rather than leave this question to speculation, the jury must decide the question of attorney's fees specifically in light of the work performed in the very case for which the fee is sought.

In light of these concerns, we hold that to recover attorney's fees under the DTPA, the plaintiff must prove that the amount of fees was both reasonably incurred and necessary to the prosecution of the case at bar, and must ask the jury to award the fees in a specific dollar amount, not as a percentage of the judgment.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

[1] After PECO brought this action, the Legislature amended the DTPA to preclude consumers from suing under the DTPA for professional negligence or for claims arising from transactions involving consideration of more than $500,000. TEX. BUS. & COM.CODE § 17.49(c) & (g).

[2] The charge asked the jury:

What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate PECO for its losses which resulted from such conduct?

Do not increase or reduce the amount in one answer because of your answer to any other question about damages.

....

....

Consider the elements of damages listed below and none other. Consider each element separately. Do not include damages for one element in any other element. Do not include interest on any amount of damages you find.

....

a. Purchase price of MPSI [Maloney] _____________

b. Costs and expenses incurred by PECO as a result of its purchase and ownership of MPSI [listing 13 categories of costs and expenses]

[3] In 1995, the Legislature amended § 17.50(b)(1) to permit recovery of "economic damages" and, if the defendant acted knowingly, "damages for mental anguish," instead of "actual damages." Act of May 17, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 414, 1995 Tex.Gen. Laws 2992.


[4] The jury charge requested the jury to calculate attorney's fees three ways: in dollars and cents, as a percentage of PECO's recovery, and as a combination of dollars and cents and percentage of recovery.

TRAP 45 Appellate Attorneys Fees as a Sanction for Frivolous Appeal

Attorney's Fees for bringing an unmeritorious appeal

[Appellee - Defendant] requests that we award it appellate attorney's fees as monetary sanctions against [Appellant - Plaintiff] for bringing a frivolous appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 45 (authorizing appellate court to award prevailing party "just damages" upon determination that appeal is frivolous).

Standard for Award of Appellate Attorney's Fees as a Sanction

In determining whether an appeal is frivolous, we review the record from the appellant's viewpoint and decide whether the appellant had reasonable grounds to believe the judgment could be reversed. Smith v. Brown, 51 S.W.3d 376, 381 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).

Whether to grant sanctions for a frivolous appeal is a matter of discretion that an appellate court exercises with prudence and caution and only after careful deliberation in truly egregious circumstances. Goss v. Houston Cmty. Newspapers, 252 S.W.3d 652, 657 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.).

Although we have rejected [Appellant's] arguments on appeal, we cannot characterize the appeal as objectively frivolous. Accordingly, we overrule [Appellee's] request.

SOURCE: 03-07-00072-CV (9/11/09)

SoL and Accrual Date for Breach of Contract Actions

What is the limitations period for bringing suit for breach of contract in Texas? When does the claim accrue for purposes of starting the running of limitations? How long does the Plaintiff have time to file suit without running in limitations problems?

The statute of limitations for a breach-of-contract action is four years from the date the cause of action accrues. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.051 (West 2008); Stine v. Stewart, 80 S.W.3d 586, 592 (Tex. 2002).

As a general rule, a cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when facts come into existence that authorize a party to seek a judicial remedy. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 211 (Tex. 2003 ). In most cases, a cause of action accrues when a wrongful act causes a legal injury, regardless of when the plaintiff learns of that injury or if all resulting damages have yet occurred. Id.

In order to determine when [Plaintiff's] cause of action accrued, we must first look at the injury on which he based his cause of action and then determine when the facts underlying the cause of action came into existence. See id.

SOURCE: AUSTIN COURT OF APPEALS - 03-07-00072-CV (because there is no genuine issue of material fact that the Plaintiff filed suit more than four years after his cause of action accrued, the Austin Court of Appeals affirms the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the Defendant.)

Waiver Defense Can Be Waived (Non-Waiver Clause in Contract or Settlement Agreement)

HOW DOES THE LAW DEFINE THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF WAIVER?

Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right. Straus v. Kirby Court Corp., 909 S.W.2d 105, 109 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ denied).

NON-WAIVER CLAUSE IN CONTRACT MAY PRECLUDE WAIVER DEFENSE

 Creech's entire argument is based on Christian's ultimate acceptance of Creech's untimely or replacement payments. But the parties' Agreement contains a non-waiver clause; Christian hired an attorney, and the attorney unequivocally demanded the entire amount due as a result of the default; and there is no evidence in the record that Christian intended to accept a lesser amount than what he had demanded. [...] We will not construe Christian's efforts to collect past-due amounts as a waiver of his right to a full recovery. We overrule Creech's second issue as well.

SOURCE: DALLAS COURT OF APPALS - 05-08-00952-CV

Defamation & Truth as Defense

The Elements of Defamation Cause of Action in Texas:

The elements of the [Plaintiff's] defamation claim are that: (1) [Defendant] published a statement, (2) the statement was defamatory concerning the [Plaintiff], and (3) [Defendant] acted with negligence regarding the truth of the statement. See WFAA-TV, Inc. v. McLemore, 978 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Tex. 1998).

When Is a Statement Actionable as Defamatory? Defamation defined:

A statement is defamatory if the words tend to injure a person's reputation, exposing the person to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, or financial injury. Colson v. Grohman, 24 S.W.3d 414, 421 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).
 
Defense to Defamation Claim: The Statements Made the Basis of the Lawsuit Are Substantially True
 
Truth is an affirmative defense to a claim for defamation. See Associated Press v. Cook, 17 S.W.3d 447, 452 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.). Similarly, a showing of substantial truth in a summary judgment case will defeat a defamation claim. McIlvain v. Jacobs, 794 S.W.2d 14, 15-16 (Tex. 1990). To determine substantial truth, we consider whether the defamatory statement was more damaging to the plaintiff in the mind of the average reader than a true statement would have been. McIlvain, 794 S.W.2d at 16; Barbouti v. Hearst Corp., 927 S.W.2d 37, 65 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied). This evaluation involves looking at the "gist" of the statement. McIlvain, 794 S.W.2d at 16; KTRK Television v. Felder, 950 S.W.2d 100, 105 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ). If the underlying facts as to the gist of the libelous charge are undisputed, then we can disregard any variance with respect to items of secondary importance and determine substantial truth as a matter of law. McIlvain, 794 S.W.2d at 16; KTRK Television, 950 S.W.2d at 105-06. As stated previously, the truth of a statement is an absolute defense to a claim for defamation. See Hurlbut v. Gulf Atl. Life Ins. Co., 749 S.W.2d 762, 766 (Tex. 1987). The defense of truth does not require proof that the alleged defamatory statement is literally true in every detail; substantial truth is sufficient. Howell v. Hecht, 821 S.W.2d 627, 631-32 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1991, writ denied). If [Defendant] Pohl established, as a matter of law, the substantial truth of the statements about which the Pedens [Plaintiffs] complain, he is entitled to summary judgment. McIlvain, 794 S.W.2d at 15; Gustafson v. City of Austin, 110 S.W.3d 652, 656 (Tex. App.--Austin 2003, pet. denied).

SOURCE: Appellate opinion in 01-08-00373-CV (9/10/09) 
RELATED CONCEPTS: libel, slander, business disparagement, derogatory statements, reputation and reputational damages, standing in the community, goodwill, tortious interference

Quasi-Estoppel defined

   
What is quasi-estoppel and when does it apply?

 "Quasi-estoppel precludes a party from asserting, to another's disadvantage, a right inconsistent with a position previously taken." Lopez v. Munoz, Hockema & Reed, L.L.P., 22 S.W.3d 857, 864 (Tex. 2000) "The doctrine applies when it would be unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a position inconsistent with one to which he acquiesced, or from which he accepted a benefit." Id.

SOURCE:  01-08-00373-CV (9/10/09)

Judicial Estoppel: Purpose and Applicability

Judicial Estoppel is an equitable doctrine Judicial estoppel generally prevents a party who has succeeded in maintaining a certain position in a proceeding from assuming a contrary position "simply because his interests have changed." New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749, 121 S. Ct. 1808, 1814 (2001) (quoting Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680, 689, 15 S. Ct. 555 (1895)). The purpose of judicial estoppel and the cirumstances when it is properly applied The purpose of judicial estoppel is "to protect the integrity of the judicial process." Id., 121 S. Ct. at 1814. Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine, and as such, all the circumstances of the case may be relevant. See id. at 750, 121 S. Ct. at 1815. The factors that "typically inform the decision whether to apply the doctrine" are: (1) a party's position must be "clearly inconsistent" with its earlier positions, (2) whether the parties urging of inconsistent positions threatens judicial integrity by creating a "risk of inconsistent court determinations," and (3) whether the party seeking to assert an inconsistent position would gain an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party. Id. at 750-51, 121 S. Ct. at 1815. SOURCE: 01-08-00373-CV (9/10/09)

The Elements of Collateral Estoppel

What are the Elements of Collateral Estoppel? When does collateral estoppel (not) apply? The elements of collateral estoppel are: (1) the facts sought to be litigated in the second action were fully and fairly litigated in the first action, (2) those facts were essential to the judgment in the first action, and (3) the parties were cast as adversaries in the first action. Case Funding Network, L.P. v. Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int'l, Inc., 264 S.W.3d 38, 52 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (citing Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Petta, 44 S.W.3d 575, 579 (Tex. 2001)). It is undisputed that the Pedens were not "cast as adversaries" against South Texas and Lawton in the earlier suit. Therefore, collateral estoppel does not apply. The trial court erred if it granted summary judgment on this ground. SOURCE: 01-08-00373-CV (9/10/09)

Exemplary Damages: Which causes of action support award of punitive damages?

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES MAY EXEMPLARY DAMAGES BE AWARDED?

Exemplary damages are "levied against a defendant to punish the defendant for outrageous, malicious, or otherwise morally culpable conduct." Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 41.001(5) (Vernon 2008); Transportation Ins. Co v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 16 (Tex. 1994).
 
Unless otherwise provided by statute, exemplary damages may be awarded only if the claimant proves by clear and convincing evidence that the harm with respect to which the claimant seeks recovery of exemplary damages results from (1) fraud; (2) malice; or (3) gross negligence. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 41.003(a) (Vernon 2008); see also In re Barnes, 369 B.R. 298 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007).

Bastida v Aznaran - exemplary damages - malice

STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES 

Whenever the standard of proof at trial is elevated, the standard of appellate review must likewise be elevated. S.W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Garza, 164 S.W.3d 607, 627 (Tex. 2004) (citing In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002)). In reviewing the evidence for legal sufficiency to support a finding that must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, we must look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true. Diamond Shamrock Ref. Co v. Hall, 168 S.W.3d 164, 170 (Tex. 2005); Garza, 164 S.W.3d at 627. To give appropriate deference to the fact-finder's conclusions and the role of a court conducting a legal sufficiency review, we must assume that the fact-finder resolved any disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable fact-finder could have done so. Hall, 168 S.W.3d at 170.

SOURCE: FIRST COURT OF APPEALS IN HOUSTON - 01-07-00792-CV (9/9/09)  
 

CITED TEXAS SUPREME COURT CASE 

Transportation Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 SW 2d 10 - (Tex. 1994)

How does fraudulent inducement differ from fraud plain and simple?

FRAUD CAUSE OF ACTION VS. FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT Fraudulent inducement is a particular species of fraud that arises only in the context of a contract and requires the existence of a contract as part of its proof. Haase v. Glazner, 62 S.W.3d 795, 798 (Tex. 2001); Clark v. Power Mktg. Direct, Inc., 192 S.W.3d 796, 799 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). That is, with a fraudulent inducement claim, the elements of fraud must be established as they relate to an agreement between the parties. Haase, 62 S.W.3d at 798-99. SOURCE: 01-07-00792-CV (9/10/09)