Texas Causes of Action & Affirmative Defenses

Texas Causes of Action & Affirmative Defenses

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Wednesday, April 2, 2014

Abuse of Process as a tort under Texas law

 

The tort of abuse of process

The elements of an abuse-of-process claim are (1) the defendant misused a regularly issued process—e.g., "the issuance of a citation or a writ"—for a purpose not lawfully warranted by that particular process, (2) the defendant had an ulterior motive or purpose for misusing the process, and (3) the plaintiff sustained damage from the irregularity. Detenbeck v. Koester, 886 S.W.2d 477, 480 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ); Tandy Corp. v. McGregor, 527 S.W.2d 246, 249 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Pittsburgh SNF, LLC v. PharMerica E., Inc., 2:10-CV-363-JRG-RSP, 2012 WL 4509753, at *2 (E.D. Tex. July 19, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:10-CV-363-JRG-RSP, 2012 WL 4508127 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2012) (listing examples of processes). The focus is on the use of the process once it is properly obtained, not on the motive for originally obtaining the process. See Detenbeck, 886 S.W.2d at 480-81; Tandy, 527 S.W.2d at 249 ("An action for abuse of process presupposes an originally valid and regular process, duly and properly issued."); cf. Bossin v. Towber, 894 S.W.2d 25, 33 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (explaining that malicious prosecution, by contrast, focuses on party's actions and malice in getting process issued); Tex. Beef Cattle Co. v. Green, 921 S.W.2d 203, 207-08 (Tex. 1996) (malicious prosecution case).

A suit for abuse of process must be based on an allegation that the other party misused process for a collateral purpose:

Some definite act or threat not authorized by the process . . . is required; and there is no liability where the defendant has done nothing more than carry out the process to its authorized conclusion, even though with bad intentions. The improper purpose usually takes the form of coercion to obtain a collateral advantage, not properly involved in the proceeding itself, such as the surrender of property or the payment of money, by the use of the process as a threat or a club. There is, in other words, a form of extortion, and it is what is done in the course of negotiation, rather than the issuance or any formal use of the process itself, which constitutes the tort.

Blackstock v. Tatum, 396 S.W.2d 463, 468 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1965, no writ); cf. Blanton v. Morgan, 681 S.W.2d 876, 878 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (seeking exemplary damages as means to extort settlement not abuse of process because process was used for intended purpose to require answer to petition). The process must be used to "compel[] a party to do a collateral thing which he would not be compelled to do" otherwise. See Detenbeck, 886 S.W.2d at 480; Blanton, 681 S.W.2d at 878; Baubles & Beads v. Louis Vuitton, S.A., 766 S.W.2d 377, 378-79 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, no writ) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682, cmt. b (1977)).

SOURCE: HOUSTON COURT OF APPEALS - 01-13-00463-CV - 3/27/2014

Tuesday, April 1, 2014

Suit-within-suit requirement in legal malpractice action against attorney by client alleging he lost case as a result of attorney’s error or negligence

   
Legal malpractice claim against attorney: the case-within-the-case causation element 

To prevail on a legal malpractice claim, a plaintiff must show that “(1) the attorney owed the plaintiff a duty, (2) the attorney breached that duty, (3) the breach proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries, and (4) damages occurred.” Alexander v. Turtur & Assocs., Inc., 146 S.W.3d 113, 117 (Tex. 2004); see also Greathouse v. McConnell, 982 S.W.2d 165, 172 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied). If a legal malpractice case arises from underlying litigation, a plaintiff must prove that, but for the attorney’s breach of his duty, the plaintiff would have prevailed in the underlying case. Greathouse, 982 S.W.2d at 172.

Courts often refer to this causation aspect of the plaintiff’s burden as the “suitwithin-a-suit” requirement. See id. at 173. In general, one proves causation in a legal malpractice suit by expert testimony. See Alexander, 146 S.W.3d at 119–20.

SOURCE: FIRST COURT OF APPEALS - 01-13-00099-CV - 4/1/2014  (Borrell v. Robert Scott Wiliams and his law office)

Because Borrell has not adduced evidence to support a finding that he would have prevailed in the underlying case save for his lawyer’s malpractice, we hold that he has failed to raise a fact issue regarding the “case within a case” causation element of his claim against Williams. See Merrell Dow Pharm., 953 S.W.2d at 711; TEX. R. CIV. P. 166(i). Accordingly, the trial court properly granted a no-evidence summary judgment. See Merrell Dow Pharm., 953 S.W.2d at 711; TEX. R. CIV. P. 166(i).









Monday, March 24, 2014

What must the plaintiff show in a suit to quiet title?


SUIT TO QUIET TITLE REQUIREMENTS

To prevail in a suit to quiet title, a plaintiff must prove: (1) he has an interest in a specific property; (2) title to the property is affected by a claim by the defendant; and (3) the claim, although facially valid, is invalid or unenforceable. See, e.g., Vernon v. Perrien, 390 S.W.3d 47, 61 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2012, pet. denied); see also U.S. Nat'l Bank Ass'n v. Johnson, No. 01-10-00837-CV, 2011 WL 6938507, at *3 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 30, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.). "[T]o contest a bank's foreclosure of a deed of trust, a party must, at the time of the foreclosure, either (1) be the mortgagor under the deed of trust or be in privity with the mortgagor, or (2) have an ownership interest in the property affected by the foreclosure." Ursic v. NBC Bank S. Tex., N.A., 827 S.W.2d 334, 336 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied) (citing Goswami v. Metropolitan Sav., 751 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Tex. 1988)).

STRENGTH OF PLAINTIFF'S TITLE VS WEAKNESS OF OPPONENT'S

And the plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own title, not on the weakness of his adversary's title. Fricks v. Hancock, 45 S.W.3d 322, 327 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.) (citing Alkas v. United Sav. Ass'n of Tex., Inc., 672 S.W.2d 852, 857 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). He "must allege right, title or ownership in himself with sufficient certainty to enable the court to see that plaintiff has a right of ownership that will warrant judicial interference." Ellison v. Butler, 443 S.W.2d 886, 888-89 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1969, no writ); see Wright v. Matthews, 26 S.W.3d 575, 578 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2000, pet. denied). The plaintiff has the burden of supplying the proof necessary to establish his superior equity and right to relief. Essex Crane Rental Corp. v. Carter, 371 S.W.3d 366, 387-88 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.], pet. denied) (op. on reh'g); Ellison, 443 S.W.2d at 888-89.

SOURCE: CORPUS CHRISTI COURT OF APPEALS - Nos. 13-12-00474-CV, 13-12-00753-CV Burnett v Bank of New

Monday, March 3, 2014

Breach of Note Claim - Which elements must the lender / holder / assignee prove?

    
ELEMENTS OF BREACH OF PROMISSORY NOTE
 
“To collect on a promissory note, a plaintiff must establish: (1) the existence of the note in question, (2) the defendant signed the note, (3) the plaintiff is the owner and holder of the note, and (4) a certain balance is due and owing on the note.” Cadle Co. v. Regency Homes, Inc., 21 S.W.3d 670, 674 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied); see Clark v. Dedina, 658 S.W.2d 293, 295 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ dism’d).
 
OWNERSHIP OF NOTE AND RIGHT-TO-SUE ISSUE IMPLICATES THE MERITS OF THE CLAIM [not a standing issue in the jurisdictional sense]
   
“[T]he question of whether a party is entitled to sue on a contract is sometimes informally referred to as an issue of standing.” Ashford Partners, Ltd. v. Eco Res., Inc., No. 01-09-00809-CV, 2010 WL 2991118, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 29, 2010, pet. filed); see Yasuda Fire & Marine Ins. Co. of Am. v. Criaco, 225 S.W.3d 894, 898 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.). “Nevertheless, . . . the issue does not affect the court’s jurisdiction, [and] it is not truly one of standing, but one on the merits of the contract claim itself.” Ashford Partners, 2010 WL 2991118, at *3 (citing Criaco, 225 S.W.3d at 898). Because ownership of the promissory note was an essential element of Wells Fargo’s right to collect on it, see Cadle, 21 S.W.3d at 674; Clark, 658 S.W.2d at 295, the [...] District Court’s determination that Wells Fargo did not own the promissory note is a determination on the merits, not one of jurisdiction. See Ashford Partners, 2010 WL 2991118, at *3; Criaco, 225 S.W.3d at 898.
 
SOURCE: Houston Court of Appeals 01-10-00020-CV 5/12/12

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